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ABSTRACT 
Terrorist actors focus on the global transportation system to introduce threats and 
target attacks. As the lead department for securing the transportation system into the 
United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works both domestically and 
internationally to implement programs and foreign assistance activities to secure the 
global transportation network. This thesis examines DHS’ international role by 
analyzing programs and policies implemented by its three largest global transportation 
agencies: the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, the Transportation Security 
Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Due to the breadth of DHS programs and 
activities, their stated goals and objectives, and their legal mandates, this thesis 
determines that a U.S. foreign assistance framework provides minimal insight into 
DHS’ international footprint. Instead, this research developed a simple model for 
understanding the primary components of DHS’ international mission space and 
identified operations, policy, outreach and engagement, and training and technical 
assistance as core concepts in DHS’ international mission. Using this model, DHS can 
pursue the additional recommendations developed in this thesis—applying systems 
theory as a basis for an international transportation security strategy as well as 
pursuing direct funding for its international transportation programs and activities as a 
fully integrated department—within the traditional U.S. foreign policy and national 
security institutions.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Today the very nature of travel, trade, and commerce means that one 
vulnerability or gap anywhere across the globe has the ability to impact 
security thousands of miles away…our security must be a shared 
responsibility—among governments, the private sector, individuals, and 
communities. 
—Department of Homeland Security1 
 
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government (USG) engaged in its largest 
overhaul and restructuring since the end of World War II. Looking through the “lenses of 
past institutions,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created from old and 
new agencies by experts cultivated in a Cold War structure, organized now to combat an 
agile and determined threat within a “New World Order.”2 A new world characterized by 
globalization and the growing interdependence of information, resources, people, and 
trade. Nowhere is this structural bipolarity more prevalent than within DHS’ 
transportation security mission and the component agencies responsible for securing the 
global transportation system, as these agencies are required to focus on the transportation 
system both inside the domestic United States and outside of its physical borders. 
To begin to understand the international dimension of homeland security and 
specifically, DHS’ international role, this thesis answers the question: 
Should DHS leverage international and foreign assistance programs to 
secure the global transportation system inbound to the United States? 
DHS’ strategic plan for the years 2012–2016 explicitly acknowledges the 
importance of international engagement and cooperation in two mission areas, 
“preventing terrorism, enhancing security, and securing and managing borders.”3 It 
                                                 
1 “Fact Sheet: DHS’s International Footprint,” Department of Homeland Security, last updated 
December 12, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/02/fact-sheet-dhss-international-footprint. 
2 John Fass Morton. Next-Generation Homeland Security (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2012), 1, 3. 
3 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal 
Years 2012–2016 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2012), 3, 7, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-strategic-plan-fy-2012-2016.pdf.  
 2 
acknowledges that managing and maintaining its foreign engagement activities and 
international footprint is critical to DHS’ role within the national security environment, 
noting that “our borders should not be the first line of defense against global threats.”4 
This thesis examines the international transportation security programs and foreign 
assistance activities implemented by DHS in order to determine the scope and purpose of 
DHS’ role within the international environment.5  
This research provides a comprehensive review of DHS’ international 
transportation security programs. It considers programs established by U.S. legislative 
action—in other words, those granted by statutory authority, as well as those activities 
and programs that fall within the traditional framework of U.S. foreign assistance. 
Analyzing these two categories of DHS programs—that is, those required by law versus 
those that fit within the traditional foreign assistance framework—provides in-depth 
insight into DHS’ international footprint. Each category presents a unique set of 
challenges and limitations in terms of program implementation and management. For 
example, an international program that is required by law is often funded by Congress 
through direct appropriations to DHS or the agency with primary responsibility, giving 
the respective agency greater ownership and direction for the program. Foreign assistance 
activities primarily coordinated by the Department of State (DOS) and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) often pull from various streams of 
funding within DOS that focus on a myriad of objectives, only one of which may include 
homeland security-related activities.6 Programs funded and managed by DOS and 
USAID decrease DHS’ role and lead to challenges with information sharing and program 
execution.7   
                                                 
4 DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, 8. 
5 Transportation system internationally is defined similarly to how DHS defines the transportation 
sector, including both maritime and aviation security. “Transportation Systems Sector,” DHS, accessed 
January 3, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/transportation-systems-sector.  
6 DHS Officer of the Inspector General (OIG), Management of Department of Homeland Security 
International Activities and Interests (OIG-08-71) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
June 2008), 38, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-71_Jun08.pdf. 
7 DHS OIG, Management of Department of Homeland Security, 39–41. 
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The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP), the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) are the largest 
component agencies within DHS that have missions and responsibilities for securing the 
global transportation network. Therefore, this thesis focuses on assessing each agency’s 
international programs and activities, and their stated purposes to provide 
recommendations for consideration by DHS, agency leadership, Congress, and other 
stakeholders and academic scholars. This thesis also analyzes these programs and 
activities within the context of a current U.S. foreign assistance framework as one 
approach for understanding the goals, challenges, and limitations of DHS’ international 
programs and activities. This analysis results in to recommendations and a proposed 
model for understanding DHS’ role within the international environment.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Terrorism is global in nature, crossing political and territorial boundaries, 
exploiting both the benefits and vulnerabilities of the global economy.8 This terrorist 
exploitation phenomenon is particularly significant in the area of transportation.9 
Maritime and aviation networks that are critical to fostering the flow of goods and 
services, as well as capital and labor, are key and consistent targets for terrorist groups.10 
Advances in technology and efficiency that increase the network’s ability to support and 
sustain the global economy have produced security gaps susceptible to exploitation. 
Transportation infrastructure, such as air and seaports, can be the target of the attack or 
the method of introduction. Vessels, airplanes, or boats cannot only be mechanisms for 
attack—as we saw on 9/11—but can also be the targets and vectors for introducing 
people or items that can be utilized in attacks with devastating and wide-spread 
consequences.   
                                                 
8 Van R. Johnston and Amala Nath, “Introduction: Terrorism and Transportation Security,” Review of 
Policy Research 21, no. 3 (May 1, 2004): 255, doi:10.1111/j.1541-1338.2004.00073.x. p. 255 
9 Johnston and Nath, “Introduction”; Yossi Sheffi, “Supply Chain Management under the Threat of 
International Terrorism,” The International Journal of Logistics Management 12, no. 2 (July 1, 2001): 1–
11. doi: 10.1108/09574090110806262. 
10 DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, 8. 
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Over the past five years, terrorist actors’ have continued to capitalize on the 
security gaps and vulnerabilities within the global transportation system. We saw this 
most recently in two separate bombings of commercial airliners; the first on October 31, 
2015 with the bombing of the Russian Metrojet, and again in early February 2016 with 
the explosion on Daallo Airlines Flight 3159.11 Both of these events currently believed to 
be initiated by insiders either at the airport or within the airlines themselves, a gap known 
to security officials for some time.12 While these events are recent, they follow a series of 
attacks on the aviation transportation system that include the discovery of an improvised 
explosive device (IED) in a printer cartridge on a United Parcel Services plane in 2010, 
and the Detroit-bound airliner carrying Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who wore a non-
metallic IED within his underwear.13 Maritime containerships, absent a notable terrorist 
incident, continue to be used as a method of smuggling guns, people, drugs, and other 
illicit items.14 More importantly, terrorist organizations have published multiple 
magazines and manuals to their respective followership and potential recruits, illustrating 
how to circumvent security procedures, encouraging their followers to attack the global 
transportation system.15  
The consequences of these attacks are not just the visual casualties, destruction of 
physical assets, emotion and psychological impacts as well as financial impacts of 
response and recovery. Within the transportation system, these impacts can continue to 
ripple into supply chain components through slow downs and increased costs associated 
                                                 
11 Don Melvin and Matthew Chance, “Russian Plane Crash: $50M Reward for Information,” CNN, 
last updated November 17, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/17/middleeast/russian-metrojet-crash-
bomb/index.html; Vikram Dodd, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Paul Harris, “Cargo Plane Bomb Found in 
Britain Was Primed to Blow up over US,” Guardian, November 10, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/; 
Robyn Kriel and Faith Karimi, “Airport Workers Seen with Laptop in Somalia Jet Blast,” CNN, last 
updated February 8, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/07/africa/somalia-airplane-explosion-video/
index.html.  
12 Melvin and Chance, “Russian Plane Crash”; Dodd, Norton-Taylor, and Harris, “Cargo Plane,” Kriel 
and Karimi. “Airport Workers.” 
13 Dodd, Norton-Taylor, and Harris, “Cargo Plane”; Jason Ryan, “Underwear Bomber Abdulmutallab: 
‘Proud to Kill in the Name of God,’” ABC News, February 16, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ 
underwear-bomber-abdulmutallab-sentenced-life-prison/story?id=15681576.  
14 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Sea Trafficking Report Reveals How Ships Move Guns and Drugs,” 
Guardian, January 29, 2012, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/ .  
15 Karen DeYoung, “New Issue of Jihadist Magazine Produced by Al-Qaeda in Yemen Suggests 
Attacks on U.S.,” Washington Post, December 24, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/. 
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not only to the attack itself but the resulting government regulations and security 
measures, almost indefinitely imposed on commercial and private actors across the 
system.16 
DHS maintains the legal and statutory authority through the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Act, and individual congressional appropriations to ensure 
that the transportation system inbound to the United States is protected against attack, and 
that both goods and people can arrive safely within U.S. borders.17 Through these 
authorities, DHS and its component agencies require commercial entities to implement 
and comply with U.S. security procedures at non-U.S. locations, and also to engage in 
foreign assistance activities and programs that focus on technology distribution, bilateral 
and multilateral engagement, information sharing, and technical training.18 In fiscal year 
(FY) 2012, DHS spent an estimated $451 million on these international activities and 
stationed more than 1,800 full-time equivalent personnel in more than 80 countries to 
implement these programs.19 DHS considers international and homeland security 
“inextricably linked.”20  
As the terrorists’ determination to target the global transportation system persists 
and DHS, CBP, TSA, and USCG remain committed to pursuing international programs 
and assistance activities, better understanding of their scope, operational objectives, 
legalities, limitations, and areas of improvement is necessary. International engagement 
challenges within DHS and across the USG must be mitigated to avoid creating 
additional vulnerabilities within the global transportation system. 
                                                 
16 Sheffi, “Supply Chain Management,” 10. 
17 DHS OIG, Management of Department of Homeland Security, 5–6. 
18 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combatting Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to 
Better Ensure Resources abroad Align with Priorities (GAO-13-681) (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Accountability Office, September 2013), 4. 
19 GAO, Combatting Terrorism, 18.  
20 “Fact Sheet: DHS’s International Footprint,” DHS. 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a policy analysis model focusing on the evaluation of existing 
mandates, congressionally or statute-based authorities, and the resulting programs in 
place within DHS, TSA, CBP, and USCG in relationship to their stated objectives or 
outcomes. It also examines these programs within the context of the overall U.S. foreign 
assistance framework.21 Most significantly, this methodology provides a thorough 
analysis through a comprehensive approach to provide recommendations for DHS to 
consider implementing in international transportation security programs. 
Recommendations and additional research help improve DHS’ program deployment to 
better meet its mission requirements, as well as the USG’s. 
C. ARGUMENT AND CLAIMS 
This research is built on multiple arguments and assumptions. The primary 
assumption is that understanding DHS international programs’ scope, objectives, 
outcomes, and footprints within their existing statutory framework—and the framework 
of the traditional U.S. foreign assistance system—will provide insight into DHS’ 
constraints and challenges that can illuminate areas for focus and improvement.   
Second, this thesis argues that the historical evolution of U.S. foreign assistance 
indicates that activities and goals can change, and that understanding this progression and 
applying it to DHS will provide reasonable and concrete policy recommendations for the 
department and the USG as a whole. At a minimum, the experience and evolution of the 
U.S. foreign assistance framework provides a foundation for understanding how national 
objectives in the international environment have evolved, and if DHS’ role should 
increase or decrease within that environment in relationship to the threats we face in 
global transportation security.  
Third, this research is built upon the assumption that DHS’ international programs 
and foreign assistance activities are not only within the legal, statutory, and operational 
                                                 
21 Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Helene Adrien, and Mark Perstinger. “Capacity Development: Definitions, 
Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.” Universalla Occasional Paper, no. 35 
(1999): 2. 
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authority of DHS, TSA, CBP, and USCG, but that they should remain within their 
respective scopes because of the specific subject-matter expertise that resides within 
DHS. Since DHS is the USG’s leading agency for border and transportation security, 
DHS and its component agencies should be more integrally involved and lead 
international programs that align with its five core mission areas, and specifically within 
transportation security. Understanding the scope of programs and activities within 
DHS—as well as their objectives and individual the characteristics that differentiate them 
between statutory and foreign assistance programs—supports better program planning, 
management, coordination within the USG, and ultimately program execution and 
effectiveness.  
Another key assumption is that DHS does not have a coordinated strategy or 
performance objectives for engaging in international assistance to increase security 
capabilities. Because of this lack of a strategy and performance objectives, DHS’ 
international activities are not coordinated by component agencies, resulting in 
redundancies, confusion, and inefficiencies.22 DHS also fails to understand and gauge 
how to apply development methodologies and tools for implementing foreign assistance 
programs. Developing a model for understanding the overlaps and redundancies assists in 
further refining programs and supports a call for legislative restructuring.  
Lastly, it is important to note that this research does not evaluate DHS programs’ 
effectiveness or efficiency in increasing the security of the global transportation system. 
Instead, it serves as a first step for better and more detailed understanding of DHS’ 
operations and scope within the international environment. 
D. PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE 
The threat of terrorism in the global transportation system represents “a new era 
of continuous danger.”23 The global transportation system is a complex system of people, 
things, and infrastructure that cross national boundaries; security policies must continue 
to be implemented to protect this system, but these measures must not be such that they 
                                                 
22 DHS OIG, Management of Department of Homeland Security, 30. 
23 Sheffi, “Supply Chain Management,” 1. 
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are too onerous and burdensome so that the transportation system itself ceases to 
function. Additionally, in most cases, a critical node within the system, i.e., an airport, 
seaport, truck or rail line, warehouse, or repair station is located physically and legally 
within the authority of a foreign government. U.S. laws and legal requirements are not 
applicable to these critical nodes of the global transportation system even though their 
functioning is essential to the security of the system into and within the United States. 
The complexities of the system combined with the threat and determination of 
terrorist actors make it critical to define, model, and assess the international dimension of 
DHS within the transportation sector, beginning first with first developing a basic 
understanding. Defining, modeling, and assessing DHS’ role can then lead to the more 
effective monitoring, evaluation, refinement, and potentially to more efficient policies 
and programs. An effective and efficient department strategy applied across agencies can 
create positive feedback loops within the domestic United States both from a policy 
perspective and operational security capability.  
This research can benefit multiple aspects of the homeland security enterprise, but 
is particularly focused on DHS, component agency leadership, Congress, and researchers 
who focus on national security and homeland security issues. It is the author’s argument 
that DHS’ role in international collaboration and foreign assistance is also an important 
area of convergence between national and homeland security, an area that requires 
significantly more research and exploration. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This research topic is complex and spans topics across the national security and 
homeland security enterprise working towards a common end to answer the research 
question. Following this introduction, Chapter II provides an overview of the relevant 
literature, including a discussion on the role of international programs and activities 
within DHS and foreign assistance as a security tool. Chapter III provides the data of this 
thesis through a detailed discussion of DHS statutory and legal authorities and specific 
programs implemented by CBP, TSA, and USCG. Chapter IV outlines the primary 
framework for analysis and provides a brief overview of the framework’s evolution, and 
 9 
analyzes DHS’ international program within the U.S. foreign assistance framework. 
Lastly, Chapter V includes recommendations for consideration and implementation as 
well as concluding comments. 
  
 10 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to carry out its mission to mitigate and prevent attacks on the 
transportation network, DHS—through TSA, CBP, and USCG—must operate outside the 
physical borders of the United States to implement security programs and engage with 
foreign government counterparts. While there is ample literature focused on the larger 
topic of homeland security, organizational challenges, and threats or lack thereof that face 
DHS, there is very limited research available that discusses the scope, purpose, and 
practical implementation of DHS security requirements and programs outside of the 
United States. Conversely, literature abounds across the spectrum of national security 
issues, from the use of military force, soft power, security assistance, and development 
assistance, with very little mention of a role for DHS.   
This thesis is a nascent attempt to bridge the gap that exists between homeland 
and national security literature. The literature is presented in two parts in order to explore 
areas of convergence between homeland security and national security with respect to 
DHS’ international role. The first section reviews literature that focuses on the 
international dimension of homeland security. The second part presents a snapshot of 
literature on the role of U.S. foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool. It includes 
discussion on the various types of USG assistance, including development assistance and 
security assistance, as well as a brief discussion on capacity development. Further 
discussed in Chapters III and IV, all three major agencies within DHS that have a role in 
international transportation security discuss aspects of their international programs as 
focused on “building partner capacity” in terms of security capabilities. This terminology 
is also present in multiple DOD programs that fall under the security assistance umbrella 
of U.S. foreign assistance. A short discussion on the literature in this area provides 
insight into what this terminology encompasses in order to determine how capacity 
development can be utilized by DHS or how DHS programs that focus on capacity 
development meet their objectives. Together, dividing these topics into two sections 
helps determine areas of commonality, disagreement, and gaps relevant to this thesis 
research. 
 12 
A. DHS’ INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
The discussion on the international dimension of homeland security is primarily 
based within the multitude of U.S. national security, homeland security, and 
counterterrorism strategies developed over the past fourteen years. Though these 
strategies provide a foundation for understanding the international role of DHS, it is also 
important to look outside government documents into work conducted by academic 
scholars and think tanks to gain additional insight. Even though most of this work focuses 
on DHS’ need to be more involved in international affairs and engagement, it contains 
disparagingly little detail or analysis on the programs or strategies DHS employs 
internationally.  
The first National Strategy for Homeland Security, written by the Office of 
Homeland Security eight months after the events of September 11, 2001, provides the 
initial U.S. government definition and objectives of U.S. homeland security; this 
document clearly acknowledges the international environment as critical to homeland 
security, noting that, “In the world where the terrorist pays no respect to traditional 
boundaries, our strategy for homeland security cannot stop at our borders.”24 Further, the 
strategy recognizes that threats to homeland security emanate from abroad:  
We strive to detect terrorists before they strike, to prevent them and their 
instruments of terror from entering our country....These efforts…take 
place both at home and abroad. The nature of modern terrorism requires a 
global approach to prevention.25 
This international element is a common thread among the literature and frameworks that 
call for DHS involvement in the wider homeland security arena. 
National strategies can be important in setting the direction for the nation as well 
as for framing the public and political discourse on homeland security. They also, 
however, make it challenging to understand the role of international activity within 
homeland security simply because they lack detail on programs and mechanisms by 
                                                 
24 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The White House, 
July 2002), xii, http://www.dhs.gov/publication/first-national-strategy-homeland-security. 
25 White House, National Strategy, 2. 
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which government entities should coordinate with foreign partners. Program detail is 
critical to understanding the complexities of the international environment and the level 
of effort required of DHS and its agencies to operate and collaborate with the 
international community.  
Authors and academics agree with national strategies that point to the threat of 
international terrorism as core to DHS’ mission and responsibilities. James Carafano and 
Richard Weitz contend that most terrorist attacks have an international dimension and 
that only through international cooperation can DHS succeed in its mission to secure the 
homeland.26 They cite post-World War II DOD programs as a basis for their arguments 
to demonstrate the benefits of international security assistance. The authors posit 
programs such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education 
and Training programs have not only safeguarded U.S. interests and built alliances, but 
have also helped other countries address threats, from natural disasters to internal military 
threats and have resulted in equipment compatibility and doctrine to support joint 
efforts.27 The authors also point out that although there are benefits of international 
cooperation for the Department of Defense (DOD), DHS does not have an equal seat at 
the table within the traditional international assistance framework.28 Per Carafano and 
Weitz, direct congressional funding for DHS to operate internationally is a critical factor 
in advising and supporting foreign development and post-conflict stability operations; 
aviation and maritime security are often the first priorities, and DHS has the appropriate 
subject-matter expertise to enable quicker recovery and development.29   
Dominic Traina presents a slightly different argument. By evaluating case studies 
of various international programs, Traina concludes that DHS should learn from the 
                                                 
26 James Jay Carafano, and Richard Weitz, “Enhancing International Collaboration for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, October 18, 2007, 1, http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2007/10/enhancing-international-collaboration-for-homeland-security-and-
counterterrorism.  




international training and assistance programs employed by the DOD and DOS.30 The 
author recommends that DHS change the focus of its security programs as a whole and 
argues that infusing additional concepts of “soft” power will help the programs build 
partnerships for DHS.31 Though this argument is sound, the author only reviews a few 
programs, and does not acknowledge the broader DHS capability nor its systemic 
difficulties operating within the foreign context (as outlined by Carafano and Weitz). 
A different perspective on DHS foreign operations is presented in a 2013 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendation, which provides more insight 
into specific DHS international transportation security programs and initiatives. In this 
report, the GAO outlines the organizational, budgetary, and strategic problems associated 
with DHS’ international operations, noting that DHS must operate within the U.S. State 
Department’s organizational structure at U.S. embassies worldwide.32 The GAO views 
the arrangement in a Cold-War framework (rather than in a post-9/11 context), in which 
national security institutions and hierarchies take precedence. He concludes that DHS is 
responsible for operating with State Department guidelines, and is often directly 
responsible for failed symmetry within USG priorities resulting in; confusion with 
foreign partners and relationship ownership, deficient subject-matter expertise where 
security needs may warrant, and disparate U.S. positions on security matters where 
consistency is needed.33  
Fourteen years after 9/11, it may be time to re-direct our international engagement 
paradigm. But there is a logical reason for this disconnect between traditional U.S. 
national security institutions and DHS, attributed to the last fifty years of our nation’s 
history. Nadav Morag outlines a succinct history and development of the U.S. homeland 
security governance structure, providing context for why, historically, there exists a 
                                                 
30 Dominic J. Traina, III, “Advancing U.S. Foreign Policy through Homeland Security: The Logic for 
International Training and Professional Exchanges” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
31 Traina, “Advancing U.S. Foreign Policy,” 82. 
32 GAO, Combatting Terrorism, 2. 
33 Ibid., 38. 
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profound distinction between the domestic and international spheres from an American 
perspective. 
Historically, the United States benefited from geographic isolation far 
from the wars and political machinations of the leading powers on the 
European and Asian continents. Consequently, there gradually developed 
a view that there was a distinct separation between domestic and 
international challenges and that policies (and their intended institutions) 
employed overseas were largely irrelevant domestically and vice versa.34 
Morag’s statement also provides insight into why there are challenges within the 
institutions and the American psyche for understanding the threats we face, or at a 
minimum why 9/11 was such a turning point in U.S. history. It is because of this distinct 
separation between domestic and international institutions that DHS, and the USG as a 
whole, is severely organizationally challenged to deal with a nimble and agile threat. 
Morag reinforces that the threat to the United States is transnational; through his 
comparative analyses, he finds that increased security in partner countries can mean 
increased security at home.35 While he provides a reasonable description of the 
complexities within the international environment—which include the varying structures 
of homeland security institutions in partner countries—Morag fails to examine the 
outward-facing programs within DHS employed daily to increase the security of the 
homeland.  
The challenge of the transnational threat is an area of common agreement between 
the government’s strategic frameworks and various authors. While some scratch the 
surface in reviewing or detailing out specific programs (e.g., Traina and the GAO), others 
begin to tie together more complexity within DHS’ scope and authority—complexity 
such as the systems that DHS protects or the dynamic challenges specific to the broad 
mission of DHS.  
Ryan Stiles, with a position closely aligned to the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review, makes the case that homeland security has an international dimension because of 
                                                 
34 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2011), 5. 
35 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security, 9. 
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the interconnected nature of the global system.36 Stiles focuses on the performance 
outcomes of the transportation system by outlining that the United States admits an 
estimated 500 million people into the country annually, which includes 330 million non-
citizens as well as 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars.37 Looking at the scope of 
the system that DHS must protect, Stiles breaks down nine areas where there is a specific 
international dimension to homeland security. These nine areas cover a broad scope of 
homeland security responsibilities from the need for increased border protection to 
assisting nations in fighting terrorism and protecting critical infrastructure.38 
One of the more problematic areas of divergence for researchers evidenced by this 
review, is determining if homeland security is a component of national security, or if a 
paradigm shift is necessary and homeland security should absorb elements of national 
security. Some authors, such as Stiles, Traina, and Morag, believe the international 
dimension of homeland security is a component of the traditional national security 
infrastructure and therefore lessons should be learned from those institutions on how 
international engagement, training, and alliance-building should be conducted. Carafano 
and Weitz, on the other hand, argue that changes should be made within the national 
security framework, most specifically congressional funding, to support DHS (and the 
broader homeland security enterprise) within the international environment, which has 
specific expertise in transportation, infrastructure, and law enforcement. 
Overwhelmingly, however, there exists agreement an international dimension to 
homeland security; this warrants additional research for two reasons. First, DHS has a 
significant role in international cooperation because the threat, although not singularly, 
emanates from overseas. Second, international cooperation is necessary because 
vulnerabilities exist within global networks of transportation, trade, and the cyber sphere 
that enable American interests, commerce, and citizens to communicate and prosper 
globally. Some authors, such as Carafano and Weitz and Nadav Morag, highlight the 
                                                 
36 Ryan P. Stiles, “The International Dimension of Homeland Security,” in International Law Studies, 
vol. 81, eds. Thomas McK. Sparks and Glenn M. Sulmasy, 3–15 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 
2006). 
37 Stiles, “The International Dimension,” 9. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
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threat from abroad more than others, stressing the need to either forward deploy security 
measures or work with partner countries to ensure that capacity to mitigate vulnerabilities 
is increased, therefore strengthening U.S. homeland security. 
Another area of agreement is that traditional international engagement activities 
have belonged, since the end of World War II, within the scope and framework of the 
DOS or DOD. This is also, however, where there begins the largest points of divergence 
within the literature. Due to this traditional model of DOD training and international 
alliance building, Traina argues that DHS should adopt a DOD model for training and 
implementing similar programs. GAO recommends that DHS strategically integrate into 
the DOS international engagement strategy.39 Although these positions have some 
validity, neither piece of literature takes into account the scope, purposes, culture, and 
capabilities of DHS differ from traditional national security institutions. The GAO report 
does a good job suggesting management and oversight changes, but forgoes suggesting 
DOS officials integrate DHS culture, missions, and perspectives more effectively into the 
U.S. mission construct.  
It is understandable that there are gaps and areas of divergence within the 
literature on the international dimension of homeland security. The focus of scholars and 
government agencies tends toward viewing national security as the dominant field from 
which lessons should be learned. It is also reasonable that authors draw similarities 
between DOD and DHS training programs, both for interoperability and for building 
policy consensus with foreign partners, as Traina concludes.40 Most prominently and 
significantly, the literature lacks detail about DHS international programs and 
empirical—or even subjective—analysis of DHS initiatives, which is necessary in order 
to understand the full reach of these programs and activities their validity to homeland 
security.  
As the homeland security enterprise is now over thirteen years old, there is a well-
established portfolio of international programs and activities that could be studied and 
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analyzed to further the efficiency and effectiveness of these programs. Aside from case 
studies of security measures and the structures that support the homeland security policies 
employed by other countries, there are also very few frameworks and methodologies used 
by researchers or the USG have used to assess he programs activities employed by DHS 
directly.  
B. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
U.S. foreign assistance and international engagement is a critical and systematic 
tool of foreign policy. It has evolved throughout the twentieth century from a focus on 
security assistance through military support to a tool that now spans widely across USG 
missions—from humanitarian aid to economic development, education, health, and 
security.41 Additional detail on the structure, complexity, and dynamics of U.S. foreign 
assistance is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, but it is also represented in the 
literature. The complexity of U.S. foreign assistance is manifested not only in the type of 
assistance being discussed, but also in the entangled political objectives of state interests, 
individual interests, and ethical impacts.  
Because of this complexity—and because there is little to no literature to date that 
compares foreign assistance and homeland security—this section focuses on the foreign 
assistance framework as a whole in order to determine the key arguments and ideas 
across mission disciplines. This review is loosely bounded by three areas of discussion 
most relevant to this thesis: why countries engage in foreign assistance, the impacts of 
foreign assistance, and the role of assistance in national security. These broad discussion 
areas reveal trends that DHS should consider in its foreign assistance activities. 
1. Foreign Assistance 
The reasons why countries engage in foreign assistance range from self-interest, 
national security, humanitarian objectives, economic development, and even morality. In 
“Examining the Goals of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Brian Lai presents three reasons why 
the U.S. allocates foreign assistance—national security interests, domestic pressures 
                                                 
41 “Foreign Assistance Homepage,” accessed February 27, 2016, http://beta.foreignassistance.gov. 
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influenced by interest groups (particularly business and industry), and “American 
Exceptionalism.”42 In “American Exceptionalism,” Lai acknowledges that the United 
States rewards other states with foreign assistance if they have similar democratic values 
and liberal societies that support U.S. goals for economic and political stability (as 
opposed to purely a tool for self-interest).43 Through empirical analysis between Cold-
War and post-Cold War assistance funding, Lai concludes that a strong relationship 
between security interests and foreign assistance allocations exists within the United 
States.  
Similarly, Griffin and Enos frame foreign aid as the “hindrance from without,” or 
as an attempt to improve the lives of citizens and increase their overall well-being.44 The 
authors further discuss why countries provide assistance, and the outcomes or 
consequences of these assistance activities for respective countries. Because of the 
resource inflows and outflows that are inherent in assistance programs—whether they are 
personal funds or equipment—Griffin and Enos approach the topic from an economist’s 
point of view. Their central argument is that countries engage in foreign assistance not 
for purely benevolent reasons, but due instead, to the desire for power through influence. 
Examples such as Russia providing aid to India and Guatemala from the United States 
prove that national interest is ultimately the objective of assistance packages.45 “In 
granting assistance, economic efficiency or social justice or any other criterion is 
subordinate to the national interest.”46 
There seems to be a strong argument that national security is the primary 
motivator for foreign assistance. Although Mckinley and Little argue that self-interest is a 
donor nations’ primary motivator, they also characterize the consistent tension that exists 
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45 Griffin, and J. L. Enos, “Foreign Assistance,” 314. 
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within the foreign assistance discourse.47 Similar to Callaway and Matthews, they 
describe foreign assistance as ambiguous, creating a consistent tension between aid 
designed “to provide humanitarian relief and further the long-term economic and social 
development of low-income countries” and that which serves national security 
objectives.48  
Rhonda Callaway and Elizabeth Matthews further explore this tension between 
foreign assistance objectives and impacts. Specifically, they focus on the relationship 
between human rights and national security in U.S. foreign assistance objectives.49 The 
authors explore multiple U.S. programs in Turkey, Pakistan, and Colombia, and conclude 
that even when aid programs are designed to better human conditions in the country, 
there is no evidence that conditions improved. Callaway and Matthews also provide 
detailed analysis of the tension between politics and rhetoric behind assistance programs, 
examining statements by various political leaders and public polling in the United States. 
While the authors note that “the American public demands a foreign policy based on their 
own self-image of ‘an exceptional people who stand for freedom around the world,’” they 
ultimately conclude that, in most cases, there is actually a negative relationship between 
assistance and human rights, often creating worse conditions in recipient nations.50 This 
negative impact is caused by corruption and foreign leaders’ misuse of aid; additionally, 
increased military assistance can lead to stronger militaries that have, at times, resulted in 
military takeovers of countries.51  
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In The Dictator’s Handbook, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith make a 
similar argument.52 They claim that foreign assistance is primarily targeted to buy the 
support of governments within recipient nations for two reasons: first, because it 
increases the base of supporters for democratic leaders whose supporters like the idea of 
providing assistance to troubled nations, and second, because it is used by foreign leaders 
to pay off their own supporter base.53  Foreign aid, according to de Mesquits and Smith, 
results in little improvement of the basic needs of the people within these countries and 
instead results in continued corruption of governments.54  
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas argue that increased assistance is needed to 
bolster proactive measures in “countries where transnational terrorist groups reside.”55 
The authors base their work on the assumption that “a targeted country is also reliant on 
another country’s offensive actions if the terrorists use a host country as a base from 
which to train and disperse attack forces.” They also acknowledge that there is a risk of 
regime change in recipient countries based on loss of popular support from increased 
reliance on aid.56 Through a three-staged gaming model, the authors illustrate how 
terrorism countermeasures applied in a donor versus a recipient nation can impact 
terrorist decisions to attack one or the other, or both. Based on these models, the authors 
conclude that homeland security is strongly related to foreign aid, concluding that 
specific security aid is more effective than general aid.57 Additionally, the modeling 
found that countries targeted for terrorism that fund specific proactive measures in 
recipient countries can overall deter terrorist attacks globally.58  
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Given these dichotomies of purpose and impact, there are still those who advocate 
for increased assistance. Former Secretary of State Robert M. Gates outlines security 
assistance as a way to increase the security capabilities of our international partners in the 
face of continuing threats and terrorist attacks.59 Because of the unlikelihood of another 
major combat operation like those in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002, Gates argues that 
“the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the 
effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners.”60 This effectiveness and 
credibility is dependent on the partner nation’s ability to defend itself, which means that 
building the capacity of partner nations is a necessary national security policy in the 
United States.61 Gates supports this claim by on multiple principles. First, the U.S. 
military cannot confront all the security challenges it faces across the globe; having 
partner nations that can defend themselves reduces that strain. Second, due to what Gates 
describes as a “struggle for legitimacy” and power within the Islamic world, 
strengthening other countries’ governance structures is beneficial to U.S. national 
security.62 Ultimately, Gates’ last principle is his central argument: that the instruments 
of U.S. national power, both the U.S. military as well as its civilian agencies, were 
originally developed and designed to meet a different threat, and that a change—
specifically a focus toward specific security assistance activities—is needed to meet the 
threats of the 21st century.63  
On the other hand, Larsdotter argues that even though the United States has 
trained and equipped over 80,000 local security forces across Africa to tackle violent 
extremism, it has only led to increased instability across the continent.64 More 
importantly, from the U.S. security perspective, Larsdotter states that African states have 
increasingly become safe havens for terrorist groups from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
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Maghreb, al-Shabab, and Boko Haram.65 This is mostly because the increase of 
assistance “risks being used by forces supporting insurgents that are committing human 
rights violations or restricting democratic processes.”66 Overall, Larsdotter provides 
evidence of fragile states in Thailand, Mali, and Nigeria—all countries that have received 
U.S. assistance, and that have been toppled by military coups. Larsdotter concludes that, 
because of this risk, the United States would be better off putting either its own personnel 
on the ground or working with the international community to place more foreign troops 
in the country.67 
Hindery et al. argue that development assistance should be “a core pillar of 
national security and American moral values.”68 They base this argument fundamentally 
on claims that aid has spurred economic development, most notably in Asia, and that 
ultimately a restructuring of the assistance framework in the United States to include 
depoliticizing development assistance can support the longer-term sustainability of 
development assistance programs.69 Although their argument is based on successes, they 
do not provide sufficient evidence of success in support of their positions. What these 
authors and a few others argue is that restructuring U.S. foreign assistance will have 
positive impacts on the delivery and management of assistance programs. Hindery, 
Sachs, and Smith argue that a new government department is needed, and that it should 
be structured like the United Kingdom’s.70 A new department structure would “de-
politicize assistance”71 so that it can focus on long-term (rather than short-term) projects, 
as the lack of long-term planning leads to negative impacts in recipient nations.72 
Additionally, according to the authors, restructuring U.S. assistance into a new 
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department will support the need to improve the skillsets and expertise of government 
personnel in managing and executing assistance programs.73 
Radelet argues that even though the Bush administration was able to make small 
improvements with the U.S. foreign assistance framework (such as appointing a director 
of foreign aid within DOS), the reforms did not go far enough to address the foreign 
policy challenges that the United States faces.74 Foreign assistance within the United 
States, in Radelet’s perspective, remains outdated and fragmented. This is due to its 
historical evolution, in which the USG added programs as needed to address foreign 
policy issues, resulting in a system that is spread across 20 different executive branch 
agencies with little to no coordination.75 This fragmentation and lack of coordination 
leads to confusion within the USG, but also becomes a strain on countries that are 
recipients of U.S. foreign assistance programs.76 This bureaucracy and spider web of 
regulations as the procedural foundation for foreign assistance results in high 
administrative costs, a slow delivery process, and a lack of program efficiency.77  These 
problems remain the core arguments against foreign assistance as a foreign policy and 
security tool. 
2. Capacity Development 
As is further explored in Chapter III, many DHS international programs 
implemented by TSA, CBP, and USCG mention capacity development or building 
partner capacity as program objectives. This section presents a snapshot of the literature 
on capacity development to provide context and another lens for analysis.  
Capacity development (CD) is a concept that emerged out of five decades of 
foreign assistance research and program implementation within the field of economic 
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development theory.78 At the most basic level, CD as a discipline focuses on how to 
reduce poverty, increase the economic and social welfare of individuals in countries, 
address health crises and concerns, and otherwise improve the overall “quality of life” for 
citizens around the world. In its most complex description, CD seeks to understand the 
dynamics between culture, society, groups, nation-states, and individuals within those 
contexts. Since the 1950s, different concepts and terminologies have been utilized to 
describe the study and practice of economic development.79 The terminology (such as 
“organizational development” or “institutional building”) helps define a country’s 
objectives in order to drive donor aid and projects. Lusthaus et al. argue that CD is an 
umbrella concept for the many other concepts/methodologies that have been applied 
within economic development; they base this argument on the historical evolution of 
economic development practices from institution building, to community development, 
organization development, and sustainable development.80 This evolution has caused 
CD’s complexity, and different researchers and practitioners have varying approaches to 
the discussion. This section reviews a small sample size of work, but encompasses a 
broad range of perspectives from the origins and definitions of CD to strategies and 
implementation, as well as to practical application in the context of security. 
Peter Morgan and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) define 
capacity, capacity building, and capacity development as different things.81 The UNDP 
has accepted CD as a process and utilizes it as an overarching strategy for working with 
program countries to achieve the “millennium development goals.”82 They call on their 
member states to implement capacity development approaches, stating: 
Capacity development is much more than supporting training programmes 
and the use of national expertise—these are necessary and on the rise, but 
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we must include response and support strategies for accountable 
leadership, investments in long-term education and learning, strengthened 
public systems and voice mechanisms between citizen and state and 
institutional reform that ensures a responsive public and private sector that 
manages and delivers services to those who need them most.83 
The 2008 UNDP strategy provides a step-by-step process for member countries to 
engage, but also acknowledges that CD is an objective that can be met at different levels; 
within the enabling environment (or institutions), at the organizational level, at the 
individual level, or at all three.84 Other authors and organizations acknowledge this 
relationship between capacity development and capacity building. Morgan states that CD 
“refers to the approaches, strategies, and methodologies which are used by national 
participants and/or outside interveners to help organizations and or/systems to improve 
their performance” and defines capacity separately as “the organizational and technical 
abilities, relationships and values that enable countries, organizations, groups and 
individuals at any level of society to carry out functions and achieve their development 
objectives over time.”85 Morgan goes on to acknowledge that these can happen at any of 
the three levels—individual, organizational, or institutional. These levels of CD are 
critical to the frameworks for conducting capacity development, as they indicate the focal 
points of the activity, i.e., whether or not programs and projects should be focused on 
states (at the organizational level), on the individual people in the community or country, 
or on the institutions that make up a country’s laws, norms, and practices—whether 
informal or formal. Once an objective is determined, one can then move on to the model.  
Lusthaus et al. provide a lengthy analysis of the definitions of and literature on 
CD and derive four models or approaches to CD—the organizational approach, the 
systems approach, the participatory process approach, and the institutional approach.86 
They also outline specific CD issues that should be addressed by donor nations or 
agencies in order to increase the effectiveness of their CD efforts. These issues help 
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clarify the role of consensus building, political power, and technology. Morgan and 
Bolger also offer frameworks and models for implementing CD projects, but go a bit 
further to address the perspectives of the target countries and the imperative need for 
planning, monitoring, and ongoing evaluation.87 
Across the literature, there is agreement that CD has been the most recent focus 
within development economics, and its terminology is now used to capture all of its 
predecessors’ intent but also, and most importantly, to learn from past mistakes.88 State 
capacity is a variation of CD that specifically examines the role of the state in 
relationship to its legal authority and its ability to protect and increase the welfare of its 
own citizens.89 State capacity is the focus when discussing the role of capacity and 
security, whether it be economic security, human security, security from human rights 
abuses, or political violence. Royal Gardner makes the argument that the increase in aid 
post-9/11 is focused on anti-terrorism efforts (and awarding recipient nations that support 
fighting terrorism), but also argues that, if done effectively, development assistance can 
have a deterrent effect on terrorism by providing economic, social, and political stability 
in fragile states.90 Hoebeke and Vlassenroot agree that CD and the focus on sustainability 
can increase political stability in a fragile state.91 
This convergence between security and CD needs further exploration both 
because of the resources dedicated annually by the U.S. government as a whole and 
because of the importance of understanding the specific impacts of DHS’ international 
CD efforts. If DHS is going to utilize CD as a tool, then at a minimum, they must study 
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the impacts, benefits, and lessons learned within the field of economic development. In 
Poor Economics by Abhijit V. Banerjee and Ester Duflo, although they focus on global 
poverty, the authors make arguments backed by random control trials that development 
programs can have impacts on local societies, and that monitoring, evaluating, and 
continual assessing (versus implementing broad sweeping policies and programs) results 
in increased improvement in individuals lives.92 Today, although international program 
and assistance does exist within DHS, they are not actively researching CD models or 
frameworks, let alone their effectiveness. This thesis looks to start that conversation.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In summary, these arguments are a more detailed discussion of one subset of 
foreign assistance. This review demonstrates what appears to be surface-level agreement 
that assistance is always geared to national interest, but what drives that interest is 
diverse. There is also agreement that foreign assistance evolves to meet U.S. challenges 
and that foreign assistance has a role in countering terrorism at home and abroad. The 
problem is determining if assistance programs are positively or negatively impacting 
security measures or the moral hazard of government.  
With respect to this thesis research, however, arguments discussed in this chapter 
are relevant to DHS and how it conducts foreign assistance. The first and most prevalent 
would be the findings presented by Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas. Their work 
suggests that there is evidence of increased security measures when the U.S. provides 
assistance to stable regimes with specific ties to implementation of security measures. 
This methodology of providing assistance in terms of technical training and security 
programs is one type of assistance DHS provides to countries in order to increase the 
security of the international transportation system. Additionally, as presented by 
Larsdotter, deploying U.S. personnel to implement security measures is a tool that 
mitigates the negative consequences of providing assistance to fragile states. And finally, 
the discussion on restructuring U.S. foreign assistance to include DHS—or even the 
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homeland security expertise as a whole— would afford an opportunity to better 
implement assistance programs.  
Overall, the goal of this research is not to prove the effectiveness of the U.S. 
foreign assistance system with respect to homeland security (and specifically 
international transportation security), but instead is to build basic knowledge and 
establish a framework for understanding the international role of DHS for execution of its 
mission. But at the same time, as DHS engages in multiple programs and activities 
(detailed in Chapter III), the dynamics of foreign assistance are also items for 
consideration. 
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III. GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION AND DHS INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PROGRAMS 
DHS has a broad scope of authority and mission responsibilities that range from 
preventing terrorism and enhancing security to managing borders, responding and 
ensuring resiliency to natural disasters, and safeguarding critical infrastructure systems 
from pipelines, to information technology networks and energy.93 Within the area of 
international transportation security, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency 
(CBP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) directly carry out programs and activities internationally. These activities 
include assessing aviation security procedures at foreign airports and screening cargo 
containers loaded on maritime vessels, as well as pre-clearing foreign citizens for 
customs entry to the United States at foreign airports.94 These agencies also engage in 
training and technical assistance activities that help improve the aviation and maritime 
transportation security practices of foreign governments. Although DHS expends time, 
money, and resources on international transportation programs to combat terrorism 
within the international transportation system, its authority to operate in this environment 
is limited by a fragmented patchwork of regulations and agency mandates. 
The goals of this chapter are to document how DHS implements international 
transportation security programs and why they implement these programs, as well as to 
uncover the challenges and limitations for program implementation and identify, if any, 
commonalities across programs. In order to reach these goals, this chapter outlines core 
DHS programs implemented by CBP, TSA, and USCG, as well as key legislative and 
statutory frameworks that enable their implementation. These programs and authorities 
serve as the basis of analysis for this thesis. This chapter also provides an overview of the 
global transportation network as context for understanding the purpose, complexity, and 
reach of these programs. Finally, this chapter enumerates the challenges encountered by 
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DHS, TSA, CBP, and USCG. Understanding and dissecting these challenges provides 
support for the recommendations. 
A. THE GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
The global transportation system is complex, system of system that connects 
people, goods, and information across the globe in support of trade facilitation, the global 
economy, and human mobility.95 It is best understood as many interconnected systems 
that move goods and people by different modes—such as trucks, airplanes, ocean vessels, 
and trains—through different nodes of critical infrastructure that—such as airports, 
seaports, waterways, roads, and rails. One simple shipment can be manufactured in China 
and move through multiple different countries via ship, truck, and airplane before it 
reaches its final destination.96 Depending on the route, the global transportation system 
allows an individual to feasibly travel around the world in less than two days by air.  
In support of this system, thousands of actors, including people, companies, and 
governments, work within and in parallel to the system to operate, secure, and regulate 
movement. Information and data are critical components of this system because they 
provide a mechanism for facilitation and security. The system is global, crossing borders, 
cultures, and political systems, and maritime and aviation are its two largest sectors (see 
Figures 1 and 2). 
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Figure 1.  Busiest Shipping Lanes and Largest Container Ports in 2011 
 
Source: Aaron Pittman, “6 Maps That Explain Global Supply Chains,” The Network Effect, August 
28, 2014, http://supplychainbeyond.com/6-maps-explain-global-supply-chain/. 
 
Figure 2.  Global Airline Routes 
 
Source: “Keeping Track of Flight Tracking and E-Enablement Developments,” Future Travel Experience, 
July 9, 2014, http://www.futuretravelexperience.com/2014/07/keeping-track-developments-flight-
tracking-e-enablement/. 
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Since the middle of the 20th century—when the advent of containerized cargo 
met low fuel prices and advanced telecommunications technology—global transportation 
has been a cornerstone of globalization.97 With the benefits of increased trade and human 
mobility, there have also come increased vulnerabilities; the system itself is exploited as a 
vector for terrorist activity as well as a target of attack.98 It is within this context that 
DHS operates alongside foreign authorities and commercial industries to enact and assess 
security measures that mitigate vulnerabilities. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
DHS is the primary umbrella department with mission responsibilities for 
international transportation security. The following section outlines the key statutory and 
legal authorities for DHS’ international mission. It also discusses the primary programs 
employed by DHS to achieve its mission. 
1. Mission, Legal Authorities, and Organizational Structure 
DHS defines its role in international affair as focused on pushing out U.S. 
homeland security overseas to actively engage foreign partners and improve international 
cooperation.99 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is the enabling legislation for the 
Department; while this document defines specific authorities (such as reviewing visa 
applications, conducting investigations into consular matters, and advising and training 
consular officers on security threats outside of the United States), it does not outline 
specific actions or activities applicable to international transportation security. It does, 
however, loosely ascribe a relationship by acknowledging that DHS has a responsibility 
to promote “information and education exchange with nations friendly to the United 
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States in order to promote sharing of best practices and technologies related to homeland 
security.”100  
Specific authorities and responsibilities for operating within the international 
transportation security environment lie in authorizing legislation enacted by Congress, for 
example the Maritime Security Act of 2002, the Security and Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007.101 Some of DHS’ legal authorities were also carried over when 
the Department integrated responsibilities of other agencies upon its formation, or have 
been explicitly legislated by Congress through direct appropriations. For example, TSA 
assumed responsibility for the Civil Aviation Security Liaison Program upon the 
integration of security responsibilities formerly managed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration.102  
DHS also gains authorities from the strategic framework and guidance outlined in 
national strategies across the USG, providing affirmation of its international role in 
security.103 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for 
Combatting Terrorism, and other federal strategic documents—such as the National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Outreach and 
Coordination Strategy for National Maritime Security—each call on DHS for increased 
international involvement.104 These strategies reference DHS’ capabilities in 
international transportation security and recognize their necessity; although they provide 
this affirmation, they do not specifically authorize or fund DHS’ international programs 
and activities. 
This acknowledgement with the U.S. strategic framework is important in gaining 
insight into DHS’ role within the USG, but also into how it manages its international 
activities and the challenges and limitations for the Department. Fragmentation of these 
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authorities accounts for some of the challenges that DHS currently experiences within the 
international environment, discussed later in this chapter. 
2. Programs 
Very little direct program operation and implementation happens within DHS to 
secure the international inbound transportation system. With the exception of some direct 
engagement and information sharing with foreign partners and international 
organizations, DHS is primarily responsible for developing strategy and overall 
management of the Department’s international activities.105 Although the Homeland 
Security Act places the responsibility within the Office of International Affairs (OIA) for 
“developing, coordinating, and executing departmental international policy, including 
negotiating agreements with other countries, developing policy and program, interacting 
with foreign officials, and working with DHS personnel abroad,” they do not provide 
much coordinated engagement or strategic direction for TSA, CBP, or USCG.106  
DHS OIA does participate in some international engagements with foreign 
partners and multilateral organizations, such as the European Commission and the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation group, but the majority of work to accomplish 
improvements in global transportation standards and processes is completed by 
component agencies with little direct involvement from DHS. Lastly, DHS OIA focuses a 
significant amount of time on signing agreements with various partner countries and 
organizations in order to improve global transportation standards in support of the work 
that its component agencies perform.107 Most notably, DHS OIA has entered into Global 
Supply Chain Security Agreements with the European Union and eight other 
international partners “to declare a mutual commitment toward the protection of the 
                                                 
105 Ibid., 7. 
106 Rebecca Gambler, Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Address High-
Risk Travelers and Maritime Cargo (GAO-15-668T) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, June 2015), 1, 4, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-668T.  
107 “Office of International Affairs,” DHS. 
 37 
supply chain system from terrorist attacks and disruptions, while facilitating and 
expediting the smooth flow of legitimate international trade.”108 
C. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
The CBP is the nation’s front-line agency for border control, immigration, and 
maritime trade security. CBP also has responsibilities—alongside TSA—for aviation 
supply chain security with respect to the clearance of cargo and shipments on commercial 
aircraft flying into the United States. This section outlines the key statutory and legal 
authorities for CBP’s international mission. Additionally, it discusses the organizational 
structure and primary programs employed by CBP to achieve this mission. While a full 
list of these programs can be found in Appendix A, a few programs are summarized 
within this section. 
1. Mission, Legal Authorities, and Organizational Structure 
On March 1, 2003, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, CBP 
became “the nation’s first comprehensive border security agency,”109 charged with the 
mission to 
safeguard America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous 
people and materials while enhancing the Nation’s global economic 
competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.110 
CBP is the DHS agency with the largest footprint of people and assets deployed at 
international locations to prevent bad actors and high-risk goods from entering the United 
States.111 The scope of CBP’s mission is underscored by the approximately one million 
individual travelers that enter the United States via a land, sea, or air port of entry daily, 
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and the 11 million maritime containers that arrive at seaports throughout the United 
States annually.112 
CBP characterizes its international activities within two large categories that are 
supported by its organizational structure: international initiatives and international 
operations.113 International initiatives focus on a span of activities from international 
cooperation and multilateral and bilateral engagement, to signing international 
agreements with partner countries and implementing capacity-building programs.114 
These activities are managed within the OIA. International operations, on the other hand, 
focus on running and managing specific security programs often authorized and 
mandated by Congress, such as CBP’s Preclearance program operations, currently 
deployed at 15 locations within six foreign countries.115 Responsibility for developing 
and managing these programs, to include deploying personnel, falls to CBP’s Office of 
Field Operations.116 CBP has approximately 801 full-time equivalent personnel deployed 
in 43 countries to facilitate cooperation with international partners and directly carry out 
these programs.117 In 21 of the 43 countries, CBP also operates attaché offices within 
U.S. embassies and consulates, which serve as the primary advisors to the U.S. 
ambassador or consul general of customs programs and CBP capabilities.118  
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A key piece of legislation mandating various activities and programs for CBP is 
the 2006 Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act that targets the 100-
percent screening of shipping containers travelling inbound to the United States.119 The 
SAFE Port Act is an example of a comprehensive authorizing legislation, as it outlines 
the agency’s legal mandate but also provides a specific funding stream with which to 
implement programs and establish requirements for the maritime shipping community.120 
First and foremost, the SAFE Port Act provides the legal authority for CBP to establish 
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and “provide technical assistance, equipment, and 
training to foreign ports and governments in support of the initiative.”121 It also provides 
a legal framework to recognize CBP Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
programs, as well as its joint pilot with the Department of Energy to provide equipment 
to foreign partners and conduct remote screening of shipping containers being loaded in 
foreign countries, known as the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI).122 These are three of 
CBP’s largest global supply chain security programs mandated by congress.  
CBP’s Preclearance operations are at the forefront of its strategy to secure U.S. 
borders and extend the “zone of security” to facilitate passenger travel.123 CBP is 
authorized to operate this program (and receives funding) through the Preclearance 
Authorization Act of 2015. This act codified the process by which CBP establishes an 
agreement with a foreign country to operate a Preclearance airport, outlines the process 
by which CBP must assess performance of customs processing times from Preclearance 
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sites, and coordinates with TSA to ensure various airports’ aviation security measures are 
commensurate with U.S. aviation security requirements at regular intervals.124  
CBP also develops and implements training and technical assistance programs to 
address various areas of customs and border security, including training programs that 
focus on “screening for weapons of mass destruction, port security, customs processing, 
border enforcement, and immigration inspection.”125 CBP, as the primary USG 
representative to the World Customs Organization, is instrumental in engaging 
multilaterally with customs authorities worldwide to establish global standards for 
customs security practices and organization. CBP was one of the lead customs 
organizations responsible for the development of the Framework of Standards to Secure 
and Facilitate Global Trade, more commonly referred to as the SAFE Framework of 
Standards, in 2005.126 
2. Programs 
The three largest international transportation security programs and activities are 
Preclearance Operations, the CSI, and the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) (see 
Appendix A for more programs). This section summarizes each program, its stated 
purpose and objectives as characterized by CBP, and additional information relevant to 
the international transportation environment or DHS agencies. 
a. Preclearance 
CBP’s Preclearance program is currently in place at 15 airports in six countries—
Bermuda, Canada, Ireland, the United Arab Emirates, the Bahamas, and Aruba.127 
Preclearance, which is conducted by uniformed CBP officers in the country of departure, 
focuses on early enforcement of CBP’s regulatory authority to screen passengers and 
their goods for customs entry and admissibility into the United States.128 CBP officers 
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within the United States hold the right and authority to re-inspect travelers as needed after 
arriving in the United States through standard customs procedures. CBP’s regulatory 
authority, as mentioned previously, to conduct Preclearance Operations was granted by 
Congress, and enables CBP to work with foreign authorities to ensure that high-risk 
passengers do not board flights into the United States. In this arena, CBP operates with 
full authority; whereas in other programs, CBP holds a purely advisory role.129 In 2014, 
CBP officers were able to facilitate the entry of approximately 17.4 million travelers at 
Preclearance locations, accounting for 21 percent of flights and 16 percent of passengers 
traveling into the United States.130 
Establishing, approving, and operating a Preclearance location requires that CBP 
work with TSA. CBP is also required by legislative action to ensure that the aviation 
security standards applied at the requesting airport location meet TSA requirements. Joint 
security assessments are conducted by technical teams from CBP and TSA to approve 
locations, but also often result in recommendations for security improvements to host 
countries prior to starting up operations. CBP has sought additional authorization for an 
increase in Preclearance locations, and has received letters of interest from an additional 
25 foreign airports.131 CBP has approximately 568 staff located in its Preclearance 
facilities.132 
b. Container Security Initiative
The CSI is a bilateral partnership with foreign government customs authorities 
through which CBP positions uniformed U.S. customs officers at foreign seaports to 
work alongside their counterparts. CBP officers use intelligence and automated risk 
analysis in order to identify shipments bound for the United States that are considered 
high-risk containers.133 These shipments are then referred to the foreign customs officials 
for enhanced screening and scanning measures. CSI is a voluntary program developed 
129 Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015. 
130 Eleven Years Later (testimony of Kevin McAleenan). 
131 Caldwell, Maritime Security, 14. 
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and implemented by CBP in response to the SAFE Port Act requirements; it is deployed 
at 58 ports in 33 countries, which represents approximately 80 percent of the cargo 
coming inbound to the United States on cargo containerships (see Figure 3).134 As of 
2012, CBP had spent more than $1 billion on deploying and managing the CSI 
program.135 
Figure 3.  Container Security Initiative Ports 
Source: “Container Security Initiative,” Department of State, accessed February 27, 2016, 
http://www.state.gov/cms_images/fy2005par_map_sg03_csi_600.gif. 
134 Ibid., 14. 
135 Ibid., 44. 
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c. Immigration Advisory Program
Through the IAP, CBP officers in plain clothes assist in “intercepting high-risk 
and improperly documented” materials. IAP officers also train and assist commercial air 
carriers and host country counterparts how to identify high-risk passengers, and share 
information on immigration practices to enhance international partnerships.136 Training 
focuses on how to interview and observe passengers and most up-to-date document 
review procedures.137 In 2012, IAP officers at foreign locations made over 3,000 “no 
board” recommendations.138 CBP currently has 41 IAP officers in 11 airports within the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Mexico, Panama, Netherlands, Qatar, and 
Spain.139 
D. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
The TSA secures multiple modes of transportation, most significantly the aviation 
transportation system, both for passengers and goods moving within and into the United 
States. International aviation security is a shared responsibility between TSA and CBP. 
This section outlines the key statutory and legal authorities for TSA’s international 
mission and discusses the primary programs and their objectives.  
1. Mission, Legal Authorities, and Organizational Structure
The TSA’s primary mission is to secure the nation’s transportation network in 
order to “ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce.”140 Under the 
Aviation Transportation Security Act, TSA is required by to secure all modes of 
transportation in the domestic United States, including “international commercial aviation 
136 “Customs and Border Protection’s Presence Abroad,” JCS Immigration Law, May 17, 2013, 
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https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission. 
44 
operations.”141 This mission is enabled by additional statutory requirements that 
extend beyond the physical borders of the United States.142 Title 49 United 
States Code (USC) § 44907 requires TSA to conduct assessments of aviation security 
requirements at foreign airports that serve as a last point of departure into the 
United States.143 More recently, after years of government discussion about the 
vulnerabilities of foreign repair stations and scope of authorities, TSA issued new 
regulations to codify the security assessment and compliance authority within its 
international compliance program.144 
TSA’s international programs are managed by the Office of Global Strategies 
(OGS), which was created in 2007 to focus on TSA’s international mission space and “to 
increase security by working proactively with our foreign partners and overseas 
operations affecting the U.S.”145 TSA’s international requirements and programs apply at 
approximately 280 airports with last points of departure inbound to the United States and 
700 foreign repair stations across the globe.146 In order to support this mission, TSA’s 
international personnel footprint extends beyond Washington, DC, to six regional 
operational centers that house more than 150 full-time personnel and support 
resources.147  
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TSA focuses its mission internationally in three specific areas: “compliance, 
outreach and engagement, and capacity development.”148 Those activities required by 
congressional mandate fall primarily within the area of compliance, but the TSA mission 
goes beyond its statutory requirements “to develop and promote the implementation of 
enhanced global transportation security processes and structures worldwide.”149 
Compliance activities are a critical component of OGS’ risk-based approach to identify 
aviation security risks, while outreach and engagement—in addition to capacity 
development activities—are developed and deployed to mitigate these risks.150   
Outreach and engagement are accomplished with through TSA staff. Aside from 
the 150 full-time personnel, TSA forward deploys personnel to an additional 26 locations 
that are staffed with Transportation Security Area Representatives (TSARs) and 
International Industry Representatives (IIRs).151 TSARs and IIRs, although responsible 
for all aspects of TSA’s mission, are most notably the primary conduits for TSA in the 
area of outreach and engagement.152 The map in Figure 4 illustrates the global locations 
where TSA has personnel with international aviation security objectives and 
responsibilities. 
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Figure 4.  TSA Locations with Security Objectives 
 
Source: Anna D. Hicki-Talarek, “The TSA Perspective on Airport Security,” presented at Airport 
Security 2014, 6, http://www.airportsecurityconference.com/files/2014/10/Anna-D.Hicki-Talarek-
TSA.pdf. 
TSARs are the principal liaisons responsible for developing and maintaining 
relationships with TSA’s civil aviation security authority counterparts across the globe. In 
this capacity, TSARs are also the primary contact for all aviation security-related matters 
for the entire USG, and serve as the key advisors to U.S. ambassadors, depending on how 
many countries fall within their respective areas of responsibility.153 Their scope of 
responsibilities range from coordinating in-country response in the event of aviation 
security incident and facilitating access and logistics for foreign airports and repair 
stations, to representing and promoting U.S. security interests with foreign civil aviation 
authorities. IIRs provide specific security requirements for commercial air carriers, both 
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foreign and American, inbound to the United States.154 IIRs are also critical links to all 
entities engaged in international aviation and often share information about security 
threats and strategic initiatives to mitigate threats both to industry stakeholders and 
associations across the globe.  
The final pillar of TSA’s global mission is capacity development. The focus of 
this mission area is “to enhance international aviation security performance and mitigate 
risk from inbound international air traffic by providing aviation security training or 
technology assistance to international partners.”155 TSA engages in regional and 
multilateral institutions and working groups to increase international aviation security 
standards.156 At the multilateral level, TSA’s primary engagement focuses on developing 
and assessing aviation standards under the U.N. International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.157 TSA also 
participates in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the European Civil 
Aviation Commission, and other regional forums.158 Bilaterally, TSA negotiates aviation 
security agreements based on specific partnerships, identified security needs, and mutual 
aviation security goals with many different countries to achieve its international 
objectives.159 In coordination with the U.S. Department of State, TSA also loans aviation 
security equipment to countries in order to increase their respective security capabilities 
and aviation security practices.160 
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2. Programs 
TSA deploys international security programs that fit into the mission and structure 
described in the previous subsection. For a full list of programs and their purposes, 
scopes, and objectives, see Appendix B. This section highlights two of TSA’s larger 
programs, along with their agency-specific purposes and objectives, which highlight 
multiple attributes of TSA’s mission.  
a. Foreign Airport Assessment Program  
The largest of TSA’s internationally focused programs is the Foreign Airport 
Assessment Program (FAAP). As previously discussed, through the FAAP, TSA assesses 
foreign airports themselves as well as U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers operating 
services in bound to the United States. TSA uses international regulations set by the U.N. 
International Civil Aviation Organization and its own security requirements to assess the 
effectiveness of measures applied at international airports and air carriers.161 TSA 
inspects commercial air carriers under the Aircraft Operator Standard Security 
Program—applicable to U.S. air carriers—and the Model Security Program—applicable 
to foreign air carriers.162 In 2013, TSA conducted 139 airport assessments and 1,665 air 
carrier inspections.163  
b. Capacity Development  
TSA provides targeted capacity development training to address international 
vulnerabilities discovered through FAAP, but also those discovered through a 
comprehensive risk analysis that considers multiple factors, such as threat information on 
countries, airports, and flight information, as well as consequence impacts of a potential 
attack on the international transportation network.164 Within its capacity development 
focus, TSA deploys training programs that focus on preventative security measures, crisis 
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management, basic security training, cargo security inspections, and training for partner 
government programs.165 In 2014, TSA deployed two new advanced training programs to 
assist in increased partner capacity focused on risk management and behavior 
detection.166 TSA also expanded its training curriculum by piloting a new course in air 
cargo security.167 In total, TSA conducted 42 training activities for 50 countries in FY 
2013.168  
In order to supplement this training and focus on longer-term improvements in 
airport security standards, TSA employs its Aviation Security Sustainable International 
Standards Team Program, which consists of six to seven individuals for one-week 
partnerships with respective host nations.169 Under this program, TSA has engaged with 
countries like St. Lucia, Liberia, Georgia, Palau, and Haiti.170 
E. U.S. COAST GUARD 
Maritime and port security related to vessel security, crew vetting, and port 
infrastructure falls within the responsibilities of the USCG. These responsibilities are 
carried out in close coordination with CBP. This section outlines the key statutory and 
legal authorities for the USCG’s international mission. Additionally, it discusses the 
primary programs and their purposes and objectives. 
1. Mission, Legal Authorities, and Organizational Structure 
The USCG is a unique entity, as it is both a component agency of DHS as well as 
one of the five armed forces of the United States.171 As such, USCG not only carries out 
its mission for homeland security, but is often forward deployed overseas to support the 
DOD in various aspects of its national security mission—for example, Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.172 Similar to CBP, USCG has a long history 
within the USG for carrying out any of its 11 statutory mission areas.173 With respect to 
international transportation security under DHS’ mission, USCG is the foremost agency 
charged with engaging in international port and maritime security efforts, conducting 
inspections of U.S. flagged ships, conducting port security assessments in line with the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and providing training and 
technical assistance to foreign counterparts to improve the implementation of port and 
maritime security standards.174 
The Maritime Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) requires the Coast Guard to “assess 
the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures at foreign ports that host U.S.-bound vessels, 
and other ports deemed a risk to international maritime commerce.”175 Through the 
MTSA, Congress also requires USCG to conduct port security training for ports found 
deficient in maintaining effective security measures while setting conditions for vessels 
arriving from those countries to enter the United States.176 The SAFE Port Act required 
USCG to conduct these assessments at regular intervals to ensure ongoing assessment of 
international port vulnerabilities.177  
USCG manages its international operations across four different directorates and 
both area commands; the Office of International Affairs and Foreign Policy provides 
Coast Guard leadership with strategy and input on its international programs and 
activities.178 The International Training Division manages USCG’s International Mobile 
Training Branch, which is regularly deployed at international port locations to train and 
instruct foreign partners. USCG also conducts training missions in line with its FMS 
activities under an agreement with the DOS.179 
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USCG is also the lead agency for multilateral collaboration with the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), an agency within the United Nations that develops 
international regulatory requirements for maritime safety and security.180 As the USG 
point organization, USCG represents U.S. interests in developing global maritime 
security standards, but also facilitates international partnerships for DHS and enacts 
capacity building programs as agreed to within the IMO regulatory framework.181 
2. Programs 
The largest international transportation security programs and activities analyzed 
within this research are the ISPS Port Facility Assessments, FMS, and the deployment of 
mobile training teams and the mobile training team deployment. A full list of USCG 
programs with a nexus to global transportation security can be found in Appendix C. This 
subsection provides a summary of each program, its stated purpose and objectives, and 
additional information relevant to the international transportation environment and DHS. 
a. ISPS Facility Security Assessments  
USCG’s ISPS Program was established in 2003 to ensure that the implementation 
of the ISPS Code, as required by the IMO, was followed at sea ports around the world for 
ships entering the United States. USCG’s assessment program is mandated under the 
MTSA. The ISPS code is an internationally recognized standard for port and maritime 
security measures. Under the program, USCG assesses the implementation of security 
and other anti-terrorism security measures that are in place at foreign seaports.182 The 
measures used as a basis for assessment include cargo and baggage screening, access 
controls, and other requirements essential to a port’s overall security management 
program.183  
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International Port Security liaison officers work closely with foreign government 
counterparts to build relationships that enable USCG to not only assess security measures 
at ports, but more importantly to share and align port security practices, identify areas of 
vulnerability, and address deficiencies through targeted training and continued 
collaboration.184 The USCG assessment program works with government authorities and 
port officials in more than 150 countries to ensure our foreign partners are continuing to 
grow “in their operational capabilities, situational awareness, and maritime 
governance.”185  
b. Foreign Military Sales  
USCG operates FMS program that assists nations in strengthening their maritime 
security posture and services while establishing “a direct and mutually beneficial 
relationship between the government of allied/friendly sovereign government and the 
U.S. government.”186 Through FMS, the USCG provides both “excess and new-
construction vessels” to client nations selected by the USG under both the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2006 and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.187 
In order to supplement equipment sales and purchases to further increase capacity to 
utilize the equipment, USCG provides countries and port operations with access to 
search-and-rescue planning tools and equipment, as well as training on how to use the 
equipment properly under all conditions.188 In the past five years, the USCG has 
managed approximately $100 million in sales, but more important has completed sales to 
over 22 different countries.189  
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c. Mobile Training Teams  
Through its mobile training teams, the USCG trains approximately 2,000 students 
in an estimated 60 countries annually.190 Training and technical assistance programs for 
international students ranges from maritime law enforcement to port security/safety/
environmental protection, and can also be more specific to the vulnerabilities assessed 
through the ISPS assessment team or to the specific requirements and needs of the host 
nation.191 The USCG is able to tailor its training programs through the curriculum, 
language, and delivery mechanism. This makes it flexible and effective for small groups, 
audiences with many different agencies attending, or several nations in a regional 
forum.192 Instructors are trained in foreign languages and curriculum is available in 
multiple languages to make the training more accessible to host government personnel 
and in order to more easily integrate the curriculum into the nation’s training program.193 
Mobile training teams are deployed for an average of 100 training missions a year.194 
F. CHALLENGES FOR DHS, TSA, CBP, AND USCG 
Challenges and limitations for DHS, CBP, TSA, and USCG are characterized, for 
simplicity, into two broad categories—internal and external challenges. Internal 
challenges refer to those presented within the management and oversight structure of 
DHS itself, in addition to the challenges experienced by DHS in relation to other 
government agencies, most notably the DOS. External challenges are those within the 
international environment that impact program execution or sustainability because of the 
dynamics of working with foreign partners, whether they be legal, political, or cultural 
constraints.  
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The internal challenges for DHS center around two main themes. First, given the 
legal and statutory framework that directs DHS’ global transportation mission, DHS has 
limited authority to engage in international programs—this authority is especially limited 
in the area of training and technical assistance.195 Although CBP and USCG have direct 
authority to engage in training and technical assistance, they are limited to only those 
initiatives directly granted by Congress, for example, the SAFE Port Act and CBP’s 
training programs. Agencies, independently, do not have enough broad authority to 
engage globally on security initiatives, which sometimes results in DHS being left out 
altogether in activities that could benefit from its subject-matter expertise.196 This has 
been the case in multiple projects initiated by DOS, to include the development and 
implementation of “an inbound immigration system for a host nation”197  without the 
participation of CBP, and a border water patrol project without the participation of 
USCG.198 These are only two limited examples.  
The need to coordinate and operate within the DOS and USAID management 
structure also impacts both DHS and the DOS.199 For the DOS, there is an increase in 
costs associated with providing the supporting operating framework needed to house 
DHS resources and assets.200 For both departments, a lack of structure and 
communication, in addition to a lack of coordinated strategic priorities, causes significant 
problems with aligning foreign policy priorities.201 This misalignment causes confusion 
with foreign partners and results in redundancies in programs and activities across the 
USG. DHS’ inability to coordinate with DOS training and technical assistance also 
results in a lack of funding for assistance activities and therefore missed opportunities.  
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Lastly, although DHS technically does have an operating structure for managing 
international programs and activities, the structure has not been sufficiently resourced or 
staffed to provide a guiding direction to TSA, CBP, and USCG regarding international 
efforts.202 CBP, USCG, and TSA maintain their own offices to manage international 
affairs and efforts that include policy, staff management, training programs, and 
international policies and plans; component agencies are not aware of any coordination 
efforts within DHS.203 This structure has led to uncoordinated strategic planning within 
DHS. DHS and its agencies have also struggled with a lack of funding as well as 
problems with program implementation and management, performance measurements, 
and overall program sustainability.204 TSA in particular has struggled with collecting and 
analyzing data from its FAAP program to identify security vulnerabilities or target 
training activities that could assist in measuring program performance and security 
impact.205  
Externally, the challenges are a function of operating in the international 
environment. One of the primary external constraints for DHS, TSA, CBP, and USCG 
surrounds the extraterritoriality of U.S. law. Although Congress directs program 
implementation and provides authority within the U.S. statutory framework, when 
operating globally, agencies are often challenged by foreign government counterparts 
with national sovereignty.206 Both TSA and the USCG have experienced issues with 
airport and seaport access; although both agencies have been mandated to assess security 
procedures at foreign locations, they have been denied access to these facilities by local 
governments.207   
Additionally, depending on the type of program and its requirements, host 
countries may not have the resources or political will to fulfill the U.S. requirements. The 
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Secure Freight Program was discontinued in Hong Kong in April 2009 because of 
concern about funding for ongoing equipment and infrastructure costs, as well as costs 
associated with decreased port operational efficiency.208 DHS also runs into situations in 
which countries simply disagree with the security requirements being implemented based 
on differences of perceived risk and the impacts of the intended security measures. For 
example, with respect the 100-percent scanning requirements as implemented by the 
SAFE Port Act, European and Asian customs officials do not believe the risk of terrorist 
attack is commensurate with U.S. congressionally mandated requirements.209 These 
logistical and technological challenges have not been overcome to date and, as a result, 
SFI ports have been reduced from six seaports to one—Port Qasim, Pakistan.210 
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IV. ANALYSIS: DHS WITHIN THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
FRAMEWORK 
The U.S. foreign assistance system and associated instruments of foreign policy 
have evolved since the end of World War II with respect to funding, resource 
composition, USG agency responsibilities, and policy goals.211 After September 11, 
2001, the focus of U.S. foreign assistance programs shifted from post-Cold War 
humanitarian objectives to terrorism.212 As a result of this shift, DHS—and specifically 
CBP, TSA, and USCG, as outlined in the previous chapter—play a more significant role 
within the international transportation security environment.213 Because of historical 
experience and DHS’ need to operate within the traditional foreign assistance context, 
this thesis uses one model of U.S. foreign assistance as the basis of analysis to examine 
the myriad programs discussed in Chapter III. Analyzing these programs through this 
framework provides an opportunity to evaluate the scope of DHS programs, reinforce 
previously outlined challenges, and frame any additional limitations not previously 
outlined.  
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of foreign assistance and 
how the system functions across the USG. It will walk through the basic evolutionary 
milestones of U.S. foreign assistance policy in order to understand how national 
objectives have shifted to include transportation security and global terrorism.214 The 
next section defines one type of structure for understanding the many branches and 
objectives of foreign assistance activities. Because of the evolution of U.S. foreign 
assistance, there now exists an intricate web of legislative acts and policy objectives that 
span across the whole USG, although the funding and management remain primarily 
within the scope and authority of DOS through USAID. With this type of legal and 
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management structure, there are also many ways to slice and dice the foreign assistance 
framework.215 For the purposes of this thesis, a simple definitional model was used as the 
basis for analysis and a crosswalk of the international programs and activities 
implemented by DHS were analyzed based on these definitions. The third section of this 
chapter provides the findings that resulted from this crosswalk of DHS programs and the 
U.S. foreign assistance framework (see Appendix D for a comprehensive analysis of all 
DHS programs). 
A. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
In its simplest form, foreign assistance is just that—assistance in some form or 
another—whether it be funding, training, equipment, etc.—the USG provides to other 
countries for a purpose. It most often takes the form of grants, loans, donations, direct 
assistance, equipment, technical training, commodities, or direct cash transfers.216 The 
purpose or objective can fluctuate and is driven by the interests of the specific agency 
offering the assistance, or the geopolitical context in which it is being offered. At the 
highest level, “there are three primary rationales for foreign assistance—national security, 
commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns.”217 These three basic rationales create 
a web of statutory regulations, agency scopes of authorities, definitions, and rules about 
how assistance can be allocated, what form it should take, and what ultimate purpose it 
can serve. U.S. foreign assistance is also highly elastic, as it is subject to the ubiquitous 
political tension between U.S. domestic and foreign policy goals and ongoing political 
discourse; this makes foreign assistance the constant subject of debate, whether it is over 
the size of budget, composition of assistance programs, or goals and objectives of the 
various assistance programs across the USG.218 Due to the focus on containing 
communism, national security was the largest objective for assistance programs for most 
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of the 20th century. In the later part of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century, the 
focus shifted to civil conflict and terrorism.219 
The DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development, overseen by the 
Secretary of State, have the most responsibility for managing foreign assistance programs 
within the USG, with some authority provided for the DOD with respect to military 
assistance.220 The majority of U.S. foreign assistance is managed and administered by 
USAID, but depending on the type of aid program and its objectives, a program may be 
administered and implemented by a single agency or may be administered by one agency 
and implemented by another or multiple other agencies.221 Although there are three 
primary rationales of foreign assistance, there are many subcategories. Some of these 
objectives include promoting trade, curbing weapons, protecting human rights, 
strengthening allies, improving governance, providing basic education, curbing drug 
production and human trafficking, and protecting the environment (see Appendix E for a 
full list of FY 2006–2010 objectives). 
1. History 
Although the United States had contributed economic aid in small quantities in 
the early part of the 20th century, the majority of this assistance was in the form of 
private capital investment and not a national program.222 In March 1947, President 
Truman, with a request for $400 million to provide Turkey and Greece with military and 
economic assistance against Soviet expansion, ushered in the U.S. foreign assistance 
program alongside the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. policy of containment.223 World 
War II’s devastation across Europe became a significant concern to the United States, 
causing economic and political concerns that Europe could fall victim to Soviet 
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expansion due to its inability to recover economically. Additional concerns about 
Europe’s ability to purchase U.S. exports resulted in the Marshall Plan and approximately 
$13 billion in aid for reconstruction from the years 1948 to 1951; the objectives of the 
program were “to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free 
institutions can exist.”224 The idea of collective security, combined with U.S. economic 
and political interests, continued to focus foreign assistance on Europe and then shifted to 
Asia with the fall of China to Mao Tse-tung and the respective removal of Chiang Kai-
Shek.225 Military and economic assistance remained the critical objective for foreign 
assistance throughout much of the 1950s with the collapse of the French in Indochina and 
the communist influences growing stronger in Vietnam.  
With Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, due to the successes of the previous 
programs, economic and military aid continued to be a focus of assistance policy, along 
with the added focus on conflict prevention and humanitarian efforts.226 The objectives 
were supported by the creation of USAID in 1961, and with its mission is to “partner to 
end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our 
security and prosperity.”227 The creation of USAID happened in parallel with the Foreign 
Assistance Act, which promoted long-term economic, social development, and 
humanitarian aid.228 These additional goals were implemented to increase the “bang for 
the buck” for the United States.229 
The lack of military success in Vietnam, however, eroded support and confidence 
in security assistance programs. From 1972 until approximately 1983, Congress and the 
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public began to further scrutinize security assistance programs.230 The onset of increased 
tension between the Arab world—particularly in Egypt and Israel and in the Iranian 
Revolution and the fall of the Shah—shifted the focus of assistance to the Middle East.  
When the Cold War ended, the United States lacked a coherent ideology and 
focus for foreign and national security policy and its execution.231 The Clinton 
administration began to focus on sustainable development through a variety of USAID 
objectives, such as promoting democratic principles and world population stabilization, 
“building human capacity through education and training, and meeting humanitarian 
needs.”232 With the Bush administration—particularly after September 11, 2001—foreign 
assistance became a key strategic pillar of U.S. foreign policy; rapidly, assistance 
expenditures increased from $11.2 billion in 2000 to $22.9 billion in 2006.233 This shift 
led to the current state of U.S. foreign assistance, riddled with various legislative 
authorities, regulations, and restrictions (see Appendix F for a list of legislative 
milestones). 
2. Challenges 
Because of this wide spectrum of objectives within the foreign assistance 
discipline, there is considerable overlap between agencies, programs, and funds, but there 
is no clear objective, scope, or type of assistance specified exclusively for DHS or its 
specific transportation security mission areas. As foreign assistance has become a great 
focus of U.S. national security strategy over the past three administrations, over 50 
different agencies have been involved, leading to redundancies, poor communication, and 
competing priorities.234 “At best the lack of integration means that the U.S. fails to take 
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advantage of potential synergies; at worst, these disparate efforts work at cross 
purposes.”235 
In light of this challenge and the “slow and cumbersome” DOS process for 
assistance activities, the DOD lobbied Congress for a separation of authorities.236 Section 
1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 authorizes and funds the 
DOD to provide quick deployment of training and equipment in support of foreign 
security forces, provided that “it is clear that these forces are the most suitable for the 
task.237 As discussed in more detail within Chapter II, the goals and state objectives of 
foreign assistance do not always align with their outcomes. The potential benefits and 
harmful effects of money and equipment have yet to be fully proven. 
3. Framework for Analysis 
Foreign assistance and foreign aid are often interchangeable terminologies and 
there is no one single definition across the USG.238 For the purposes of this research, a 
baseline definition for foreign assistance is a tool or instrument to promote U.S. foreign 
policy, often in one of the following forms: grants, loans, donations, direct assistance, 
equipment, technical training, commodities, or direct cash transfers.239 There are five 
major funding accounts that help structure foreign assistance environment. The existence 
of multiple breakdowns for foreign assistance was a learned constraint for this research. 
For this reason, in addition to the complexity of other breakdowns demonstrated in 
Appendix E, the simplest breakdown of U.S. foreign assistance was used as the basis for 
analysis. This breakdown is also tied to major foreign aid funding accounts in the five 
categories described in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
235 Brainard, “U.S. Foreign Assistance,” 2. 
236 Nina M. Serafino. Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”: Background and Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RS22855) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 3, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf.  
237 Serafino, Security Assistance Reform, 4. 
238 Tarnoff and Lawson, Foreign Aid, 3. 
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Table 1.   Major Categories of U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Funding 




Development assistance programs that are designed to chiefly foster sustainable - 
broad based economic progress and social stability in developing countries. Used 
for long term projects in the areas of economic reform and private sector 
development, democracy promotion, environmental protection, population 




Finance multilateral development projects implemented by international 
organizations such as the United Nation’s Children’s fund (UNICEF) and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and by multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank. 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Devoted to the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies. Funded under 
the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and 
Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts aimed at address the needs of refugees 
and internally displaced persons. This funding account also accounts for Food 
assistance, generically referred to as P.L. 480 or the Food for Peace program, 
which provides U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries. 
Civilian Security 
Assistance 
Aimed at global concerns that are considered threats to U.S. security and well-
being - terrorism, illicit narcotics, crime, and weapons proliferation. Aid programs 
that provide a range of law enforcement activities, training, and equipment. The 
international Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and the 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) 
account are a part of this category. Anti-terrorism programs including detecting 
and dismantling terrorist financial networks, establishing watchlist systems at 
border controls, and building developing country anti-terrorism capacities are a 
part of this account as well as nonproliferation efforts to support the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and building capacity to detect and interdict transfer of 
weapons and deliver systems over borders. 
Military Assistance 
The U.S. military provides military assistance to U.S. friends and allies to help 
them acquire U.S. military equipment and training. There are three main programs 
administered by DOS but implemented by DOD. These are the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) program that is a grant program that enables government to 
receive equipment from the U.S. government or access equipment directly 
through U.S. commercial channels. Most FMS grants support the security needs 
of Israel and Egypt. The International Military and Education Training (IMET) 
program offers military training on a grant basis to foreign military officers and 
personnel. Peacekeeping funds also come from the State Department to support 
voluntary non-UN operations as well as training for an African crisis response 
force. 
Adapted from Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. 
Programs and Policy (CRS Report No. R40213) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 




The primary goal of this research was to determine if DHS should leverage 
international and foreign assistance programs within its strategy to secure the global 
transportation system inbound to the United States. In order to do this, this research 
tackled additional questions to lay the foundation for a policy analysis. These questions 
were necessary to enumerate what programs DHS has in place, understand their scope 
and objectives as stated by the agencies themselves, and illuminate how these programs 
and activities are conducted in terms of resources and statutory authorities. The policy 
analysis model utilized DHS programs and activities as data and examined their stated 
agency purposes and objectives against one U.S. foreign assistance model for 
comparison. For the detailed methodology and crosswalk, see Appendix D. This analysis 
revealed a multitude of findings.  
First and foremost, this research substantiated that DHS implements numerous 
programs across its component agencies both under statutory authority and under a 
traditional foreign assistance framework. Approximately 30 percent of the international 
transportation security programs employed by DHS have attributes that could be 
characterized as foreign assistance activities and the majority of these programs could be 
defined as civilian security assistance (see Table 2). At the same time, while the data 
demonstrated a relationship between DHS programs and foreign assistance, this in-depth 
review of programs and their objectives was unable to draw a specific connection with 
DOS or USAID funding or coordination. With the exception of a portion of TSA’s 
equipment loan program funded by DOS/USAID and the USCG’s FMS programs, it is 
not clear from this research exactly how other programs across DHS are coordinated with 
the DOS.240 
  
                                                 
240 See Appendix B. Only the TSA Equipment Loan Program can be attributed through Department of 
State funding mechanisms and coordination.  
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Foreign Assistance Category 
CBP 11 3 Civilian Security Assistance 
TSA 13 5 Civilian Security Assistance 
USCG 6 2 Civilian/Military Security Assistance 
Total DHS 30 10 30% Civilian Security Assistance 
 
This lack of connection could be evidence that agencies are conducting activities 
outside of the traditional foreign assistance framework through direct appropriations or 
other funding streams. In turn, this could be due to poor information sharing or the overly 
burdensome bureaucracy associated with DOS and USAID, demonstrated by the 
patchwork of legislative acts and the disjointed evolutionary process. Navigating funding 
streams and objectives in addition to the restrictions contained within the legislation can 
cause agencies to avoid operating within this structure. It may also be due to a simple 
lack of available data. Either way, the confusion, funding, and agency responsibilities 
associated with a complex regulatory framework present challenges for DHS to operate 
internationally.  
Foreign assistance makes up only a small portion of the overall programs and 
activities in which DHS engages within the international environment. The larger portion 
of the DHS international footprint is spent on compliance and enforcement operations 
and international engagement and outreach—both bilaterally and multilaterally with 
foreign government partners as well as industry stakeholders—as well as on writing and 
implementing policies for stakeholders and conducting training programs as “capacity 
development.” Although limited by statutory authority to do so, each agency engages 
within programs that could be characterized as training and technical assistance–if not by 
the agencies’ own categorizations, then by their characterization of offerings of training 
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and assistance programs in their specific areas of expertise (for example, TSA’s array of 
aviation security training and CBP’s over 100 training program on border control and 
operations).241  
Another finding is that each agency within this research utilizes the terminology 
“capacity building” for partner nations as a stated objective or goal of respective 
programs and activities. It is unclear, however, what DHS or each agency means by the 
term or how their programs are structured, planned, implemented, and monitored for 
longer-term sustainment, as is well as evidenced in DOD’s partner capacity building 
model.  
Lastly, it is clear that DHS internally does not have a strategy or a common model 
within for defining the functions for international programs and activities. Without a 
cohesive strategy, DHS encounters challenges when operating in the international arena, 
both with external partners and foreign government counterparts, but also within the USG 
framework. Between 2011 and 2012, DHS conducted a comprehensive review of its 
international resources footprint, but it still lacks priorities across its agencies, does not 
monitor or evaluate its programs, and fails to track program cost data for analysis.242 The 
critical areas of commonality within DHS can be leveraged to better understand and 
structure the international dimension of DHS both for internal and external purposes. 
C. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research concludes that, due to the scope, reach, and importance of the 
international transportation network, DHS should continue to leverage its international 
programs and activities as strategic tools to secure the nation’s transportation system. 
While this conclusion is supported by the fact that, historically, U.S. engagement while 
can impact security outcomes, it is clear that improvements both within DHS as well as 
the overall U.S. foreign assistance framework is needed. DHS needs to improve its 
program management, evaluation, and overall implementation of international programs 
and activities. Across the USG, if there is to be any focus on security effectiveness, DHS, 
                                                 
241 DHS OIG, Management of Department of Homeland Security. 
242 Gambler, Border Security, 5–6. 
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DOS, and DOD need to coordinate more effectively to diminish redundancies and 
confusion for international partners as well as establish a framework that fully integrates 
the security capabilities of agencies across the spectrum. In a time of perpetual threat 
from terrorist actors and diminishing budgets, deploying programs without better 
planning, administration, and evaluation is activity without action and impact.  
Although many scholars, researchers, and practitioners note DHS’ limitations in 
the international environment due to the need to operate within the traditional U.S. 
foreign assistance framework, this research also concludes that a foreign assistance 
framework was minimally useful as a methodology of analysis and that DHS operates 
with more frequency within the international environment through direct appropriations 
and statutory authorities. The relationship between foreign assistance activities and DHS’ 
international footprint is not proportional to the level of attention that it receives in the 
scholarly literature. Therefore, this research concludes the U.S. foreign assistance 
framework is not sufficiently beneficial to model or conceive DHS’ international 
dimension and that instead consideration should be given to DHS as a fully operational 
entity within the international institutions within the USG.  
Due to these findings and conclusions, this thesis suggests multiple 
recommendations and opportunities for further research as actions for DHS and the USG 
build increased international security capabilities. 
1. Proposed Model 
DHS lacks a clear operating framework and model for understanding its 
international role and capabilities, which translates to a lack of a strategy, causing 
disruptions and challenges internally and externally. While each agency within the 
department categorizes its international programs and activities differently, pursuing their 
own operational model, there are, in fact, commonalities uncovered within this research. 
These commonalities can serve as the basis of an operational model to further DHS’ 
international efforts directly, as well as support better alignment across the USG. These 
commonalities are characterized as operational, policy, outreach and engagement, and 
training and technical assistance.  
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The term operational is defined as a program required by congressional statute or 
requiring a specific security requirement to be carried out by CBP, TSA, and USCG 
personnel. The term policy defines a program that requires the commercial industry or a 
country to carry out certain measures in order to meet U.S. standards (which are written 
and set by DHS and its agencies). Outreach and engagement is defined as activities 
related to bilateral discussions, information sharing, and working with multilateral 
organizations or industry partners. Training and technical assistance describes activities 
that deliver training curriculum within a certain subject-matter area related to 
transportation security or providing equipment or loans for equipment, alongside training 
or maintenance or funding for that equipment.  
The chart in Figure 5 is a representation of DHS’ international program activities 
as researched within this thesis and as outlined in Appendix D. It not only represents each 
type of program within the agencies, but also the overlap and convergence of programs 
across TSA, CBP, and USCG. The small triangular area represents training and technical 
assistance activities deployed by DHS. This area is called out, but still demonstrates 
overlap between agencies, because this is the area where DHS is significantly constrained 
by the lack of statutory authority to conduct efforts without working through DoS. 
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Figure 5.  DHS International Programs Model 
 
 
Using this model, DHS and its component agencies can work to establish a 
strategy for international engagement and assistance. This model serves as a baseline for 
understanding international operations and working internally with more information to 
determine redundancies, costs, priorities, agency capabilities, scopes, and missions. This 
model also simplifies DHS’ complex international footprint and can support DHS’ efforts 
to pursue the additional recommendations outlined. 
2. Lobby Congress for Direct Funding 
DHS should be fully integrated into the USG international security and foreign 
assistance apparatus. A first step towards this goal includes working within DHS to 
request direct funding from Congress to conduct international programs and activities. 
Given the scope of programs within and outside of its direct statutory authorities and the 
minimal relationship between DHS and the DOS foreign assistance framework, the 
department should seek authorization for direct funding for all of its international 
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programs. DHS has this specific subject-matter expertise in transportation security, 
therefore changes to the legislative framework and operating structure of the USG should 
be considered to further streamline DHS’ ability to operate internationally and capitalized 
on its security capabilities.   
Legislation similar to DOD’s request for 1206 reform would help DHS respond 
faster to crisis situations—with less DOS oversight, DHS could more efficiently deploy 
personnel and equipment. Direct appropriations for funding international programs and 
activities can also decrease the knowledge gap about assistance activities or the need to 
navigate around associated DOS requirements. The recommended model can provide 
DHS with a common platform for programs in order to request funding. 
3. Opportunities for Additional Research 
Opportunities for additional research can also build off the basic model 
recommended in Figure 5 while revealing a more detailed understanding of DHS 
programs and activities. More programmatic detail will inform DHS and Congress on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of DHS’ international transportation security programs and 
better identify areas where redundancy and overlap between agencies is present. 
Additional research can also improve DHS’ management of international activities and 
inform the discussion on the convergence of homeland and national security across the 
USG, supporting efforts to define better tools, strategies, and programs to deter and 
mitigate the current and future terrorist threats to the United States.  
The first area for additional research should focus on specific programs and their 
implementation, management, and methods of monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring 
and evaluation can serve multiple groups from “host country citizens and institutions to 
U.S. decision makers”243 and support determinations of program efficiency and 
effectiveness. Monitoring, evaluation, and assessment can also identify programs that are 
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no longer necessary, freeing up resources and opportunities to focus on areas of true need 
within the international transportation security environment.  
The discipline of systems dynamics and systems theory as a way of modeling and 
testing the impact and outcomes of DHS’ international transportation security program 
and activities is an additional area of research for which this thesis has provided a simple 
foundation. By establishing a common operational model for DHS within this sphere, 
DHS can now bring together TSA, CBP, and USCG to develop an approach for 
deploying its capabilities toward the global transportation network as a complex system. 
Systems theory contends that systems are sets of things that are “interconnected in such a 
way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time.”244 Due to this ability to 
produce their own behavior, systems also change their behavior organically to outside 
forces, manifested in feedback loops.245 A lack of understanding of these feedback loops 
results in adverse reaction within the system.246  
Policies and programs developed and implemented by DHS agencies are outside 
forces with the global transportation system. Implemented without consideration of the 
system as a system, they aggravate and impact the systems behavior. Programs 
implemented independently as single agencies further increases that impact and can cause 
system disruptions. Systems theory has been applied to a variety of disciplines from 
population growth to depletion of natural resources and has demonstrated the positive 
impacts of modeling and understanding feedback looks to result in positive programs and 
outcomes.247  Research into its application for DHS can yield similar benefits for 
homeland security.  
Lastly, as each agency uses the term “capacity development” differently—and 
given the USG’s push in the foreign assistance dimension to “build partner capacity”—
more research into DHS’ programs that focus on capacity development would help 
                                                 
244 Donella H., Meadows and Diana Wright, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, 
VT: Chelsea Green, 2008), 2. 
245 Meadows and Wright, Thinking in Systems, 17–23. 
246 Jay W. Forrester, “Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems,” Constitution.org, March 1995, 5, 
http://constitution.org/ps/cbss.pdf. 
247 Forrester, “Counterintuitive Behavior,” 53. 
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determine the effectiveness of this work. Research exists in the area of development 
assistance—as well as within the DOD—that could be used to analyze DHS’ capacity 
development programs. However, this requires additional detail to be available via open-
source materials, or from other research methods used to gain more information from 
DHS agencies. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
This research focused on open-source materials to determine information on 
DHS’ international transportation security programs, which limits this research to 
agency-published documents, reports, and the work of authors and scholars, which often 
lacked detail on program costs, program objectives, performance measures, planning 
cycles, and program life cycles. Without additional detail, this research was unable to 
look deeper into program components and requirements in order to identify efficiencies, 
redundancies, and effectiveness.  
Additionally, program analyses were subjected to the researcher’s bias in an 
attempt to correlate the stated purposes of the programs with types of foreign assistance 
activities found within the U.S. foreign assistance framework. This is most recognizable 
within the categorization of how specific agencies structure their international programs 
and activities. For example, while it was discoverable that TSA considers its international 
training activities to be “capacity development,” this research was not able to determine 
how CBP characterizes its training programs.  
Depending on how these items are funded, they can be at the appropriations level 
or account level; without further research, it is difficult to determine how funding 
works.248 Where available, general cost projections were provided. This is also due to the 
lack of detailed program data in open-source information. 
 
                                                 
248 Caldwell, Maritime Security, 3. 
 73 
E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to determine if DHS should pursue international 
programs and activities in its mission to secure the global transportation system. This was 
done through researching DHS’ international transportation security programs and 
activities in three biggest transportation security agencies (TSA, CBP, and USCG), and 
how these programs or actives are implemented (i.e., by what legal and statutory 
authority), and for what purpose (i.e., stated program objectives).   
While this research focused simply on building knowledge about DHS’ operations 
and security capabilities in the international environment, it provided a sound basis for 
additional research and recommendations that could impact not only DHS and its 
component agencies, but also the national security framework and institutions of the USG 
as a whole. These points of intervention outlined above include; developing a 
comprehensive strategy across DHS based on a simple operational model; lobbying 
Congress for direct funding of DHS’ international programs and activities; establishing 
program management, monitoring and evaluation practices; applying systems theory as a 
basis for analyzing the international transportation system; and reviewing models of 
capacity development including DOD examples as a way of furthering its own capacity 
development efforts.  
As DHS and the homeland security enterprise continue to debate their 
organization and develop strategies to mitigate and deter threats, they cannot do so 
without considering the research presented within this thesis along with its 
recommendations for improvement and further research. Additionally, this thesis 
contributes to the discussion of DHS within the national security framework illustrating 
the reach of DHS’ international footprint in transportation security. 
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APPENDIX A.  CBP AGENCY PROGRAMS   
Program Description/State Agency Objectives and Goals 
Preclearance 
Travelers and their goods are inspected for U.S. customs requirements the 
same as they would at the U.S. Port of Entry by CBP Officers. The same 
immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections of international air 
passengers performed at foreign airports. There are currently 15 foreign 
airports in six different countries that are also preclearance sites.249 Airports 
must meet TSA aviation security standards through an assessment process 
before operations begin.250 
Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) 
The CSI is a bilateral partnership initiative through which CBP positions 
uniformed customs officers at foreign seaports in order to identify shipments 




Through the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), CBP officers in plain 
clothes assist with identifying high risk passengers. They also train and assist 
commercial air carriers and host country counterparts in how to identify high 
risk passengers as well as share information on immigration practices to 
enhance international partnerships.252 Training focuses on how to interview 
and observe passengers in addition to using the proper and most up to date 
document review procedures.253 
Secure Freight 
Initiative (SFI) 
SFI was a requirement in appropriations by Congress charging DHS and CBP 
in 2007 with implementing a pilot at foreign ports through which all U.S. 
bound containers undergo radiation screening and internal imaging scans that 
are remotely reviewed analysts remotely for potential threats.254 Logistical 
and technological challenges such as who will continue to pay for 
maintenance and operation of the port security technologies has led this 
program to reduce from six ports to one.255 Under SFI, CBP and DOE 
provide the equipment to the terminal operators with the non-intrusive 
detection technology at the foreign port, while CBP officers, stationed in the 
United States review all of the data on containers as well as their NII images 
                                                 
249 “CBP Preclearance,” CBP. 
250 Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015, H.R. 998, Sec. 3 (2015).  
251 CBP, Container Security Initiative (Washington, DC: CBP, May 2011), 1, https://www.cbp.gov/
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252 “Immigration Advisory Program (IAP): Fact Sheet,” CBP, May 2013, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/
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255 Lord, Aviation Security, 17. 
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Program Description/State Agency Objectives and Goals 
to make determination as whether the container and its contents need to be 
screened further.256 
C-TPAT 
There are currently over 10,000 industry partners who are certified members 
of the CBP Customs - Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which 
establishes specific supply chain security criteria that partners must follow in 
return for benefits like expedited customs processing at the port of entry 
(POE). Supply chain security that industry partners must following include 
facility, personnel, and access controls.257  
Importer Security 
Filing 
Under this rule, cargo arriving by containership must electronically submit 
certain advance cargo information in the form of an security filing. This 
includes; seller, buy, importer of record number, consolidator, stuffing 
locations, commodity number, ship to party, etc.258 This information is 
required 24 hours before a shipment is loaded on a vessel bound for the 






“Agreements that allow for the exchange of information, intelligence, and 
documents that will ultimately assist countries in the prevention and 
investigation of customs offenses. The agreements are particularly helpful for 
U.S. Attaché offices, as each agreement is tailored to the capacities and 
national policy of an individual country’s customs administration. CBP 
currently has 53 signed CMAAs with various nations.”259 
CBP Attaches 
“CBP operates Attaché Offices in 21 countries around the world. Attachés are 
posted in U.S. Embassies and Consulates and serve as the Chief of Mission’s 
Customs and Border Protection in-house specialists where they inform and 
advise the U.S. Ambassador or Consul General on CBP programs and 
capabilities. CBP Attachés support and oversee all CBP programs in their area 
of responsibility. Additionally, they seek to educate stakeholders about CBP’s 
international programs such as: the Container Security Initiative; the 
Immigration Advisory Program; the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism, and; various capacity building programs.”260 
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Program Description/State Agency Objectives and Goals 
Mutual Recognition 
Agreements 
“Mutual Recognition refers to those activities associated with the signing of a 
document between U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and a foreign 
Customs Administration that provides the platform for the exchange of 
membership information and recognizes the compatibility of each other’s 
supply chain security program. The document, referred to as an 
“arrangement,” indicates that the security requirements or standards of the 
foreign industry partnership program, as well as its verification procedures, 
are the same or similar with those of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRA), 
therefore, are bilateral understandings between two Customs 
Administrations.”261 
 
CBP has signed ten MRAs with New Zealand, Canada, Jordan, Japan, Korea, 
European Union, Taiwan, Israel, Singapore, Mexico.262 
World Customs 
Organization 
CBP is the lead U.S. agency engaged with the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), and is responsible for developing security standards and regulations 
for implementation globally. CBP represents U.S. positions on Customs 
matters and as a part of these activities, CBP is integral in the “drafting and 
approval of best practices, guidelines and standards relating to international 
customs issues. In addition, CBP provides unparalleled training and technical 
assistance to the WCO in the development and delivery of its international 




“U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides a wide array of short-
term and long-term technical training and assistance to host nations Customs 
and Border security agencies. Based on CBP’s expertise as the front-line 
border security agency for the United States, these programs are designed to 
build the capacity of foreign law enforcement agencies to implement more 
effective customs operations, border policing, and immigration inspections. 
CBP coordinates and presents over 100 training programs to thousands of 
foreign participants each year. Training and assistance programs target the full 
range of border control and operations, including: weapons of mass effect 
(WME) training, anti-narcotics, port security, integrity, and commercial 
operations.”264   
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APPENDIX B.  TSA INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 




FAAP airport visits “assess the effectiveness of security measures at 
foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, from which a foreign air 
carrier serves the U.S. that pose a high risk of introducing danger to 
international air travel, and at other foreign airports deemed appropriate 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security.”265 
Foreign Air Carrier and 
U.S. Aircraft Operator 
Assessments 
Conduct inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers that travel 
to the U.S. from foreign airports to ensure that they meet the security 
requirements in the respective TSA-approved security program.266 
Federal Air Marshall 
Law Enforcement 
Training 
TSA’s Federal Air Marshals Service training to foreign law enforcement 
personnel is required by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act.267    
National Cargo Security 
Program (NCSP) 
TSA conducts reviews of foreign nation’s air cargo screening and 
security requirements “to determine whether their programs provide a 
level of security commensurate with the level of security provided by 
existing U.S. air cargo security programs.”268  Countries that are 
assessed to have commensurate security requirements recognized under 
NCSP and therefore no additional screening measures outside of the host 
countries’ are required to be conducted for cargo traveling to the U.S. 
Currently, TSA has NCSP recognition agreements with all 28 European 
Union Member States as well as Australia, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Japan, 





ASSIST “provides comprehensive technical assistance to countries with 
demonstrated difficulty in satisfying the security Standards and 
appropriate Recommended Practices established by ICAO. The ASSIST 
program addresses the self-identified civil aviation security needs of the 
host nation by aiding the establishment of sustainable institutions and 
practices through aviation security training, technical assistance and 
overall security assessments.”270 
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Program Description/State Agency Objectives and Goals 
Aviation Training & 
Technical Assistance 
To mitigate risk by helping partner nations build sustainable aviation 
security practices, TSA provides aviation security training to foreign 
partners in courses from “screener supervisory skills, preventative 
security measures, crisis management, basic security, cargo security 
inspections, and train-the-trainer programs.”271 
Equipment Loan 
Program 
Funded by Department of State under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program (ATA) TSA has provided equipment loans to Malta, Aruba, 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Haiti, Ireland, Kenya. After the events of October 
2010, TSA provided Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) hand held to 
Yemen.272 
TSA Security Programs 
TSA requires that each air carriers adopt and follow a TSA approved 
security program for passenger and non-passenger operations. U.S. Air 
Carriers are subjected to the requirements of the Aircraft Operator 
Standard Security Program (SSP) and foreign air carriers are subjected to 
the requirements of the Model Security Program (MSP).273 
Air Cargo Advance 
Screening (ACAS) Pilot 
Program 
In coordination with CBP, obtain manifest and shipment information for 
cargo destined on inbound passenger and all-cargo flights.274 
Rapid Response Team 
Oversee all international critical incident management activities to get 
into a region in crisis quickly and mitigate security vulnerabilities in 
support of TSA’s mission. The Rapid Response Team responded to the 





Work with governments in foreign countries to develop effective and 
complimentary transportation security measures and to support 




TSA conducts outreach and engagement activities with the aviation 
industry, particularly air carriers and aviation stakeholders such as the 
International Air Transportation Association (IATA), Air Transport 
                                                 
271 “Testimony on Examining TSA’s Global Efforts to Protect the Homeland from Aviation Threats 
and Enhance Security at Last Point of Departure Airports,” TSA, December 8, 2015, https://www.tsa.gov/
news/testimony/2015/12/08/testimony-hearing-%E2%80%9Cexamining-tsas-global-efforts-protect-
homeland.  
272 Lord, Aviation Security, 21. 
273 Ibid., 9. 
274 Strengthening International Cooperation on Aviation Security (statement of John W. Halinski).  
275 Ibid.  
276 Lord, Aviation Security, 6. 
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Association (ATA), American Association of Airport Executives, 
Airports Council International (ACI), and the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC).277 
U.N. International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) 
ICAO “sets standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, 
security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for aviation environmental 
protection. ICAO also serves as a clearinghouse for cooperation and 
discussion on civil aviation issues among its 191 member-states.”278 
TSA assesses airport security standards through ICAO. Additionally, 
through these relationships, TSA is able to better understand a partner’s 
security capabilities and exchange best practices.279 
 
  
                                                 
277 Daly, “Panel Discussion: International Harmonization,” 11. 
278 “About Us,” International Civil Aviation Organization, accessed February 27, 2016, 
http://icao.usmission.gov/about-us.html.  
279 Strengthening International Cooperation on Aviation Security (statement of John W. Halinski). 
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APPENDIX C.  USCG PROGRAMS 




The “U.S. Coast Guard’s International Port Security (IPS) Program was 
established in 2003 to reinforce implementation of the ISPS Code as 
part of the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). 
Through the assessment of ISPS Code implementation and other anti-
terrorism security measures in foreign ports and through bilateral 
discussions to share and align port security practices, the Coast Guard 
IPS Program seeks to reduce risks to U.S. ports and ships, and to the 
entire maritime transport system.”280 
International Training 
“Each year Coast Guard training and technical assistance teams train 
approximately 2,500 international students in approximately 60 
countries. Training is available in all Coast Guard mission areas and can 
also be tailored to host nation needs. The Coast Guard can deliver a 
complete package of training to small groups, multi-agency audiences, 
or several nations in a regional forum. Instructors often utilize lesson 
plans in the host nation’s language for infusion into the host nation’s 
training program.”281 
Foreign Military Sales 
“The Coast Guard Foreign Military Sales program helps many nations 
strengthen their maritime services by providing equipment and support 
services. The Coast Guard provides both excess and new-construction 
vessels to clients selected by the United States government. In addition 
to cutters and boats, the Coast Guard provides clients with access to the 
most modern Search and Rescue planning tools and equipment. The 
Coast Guard provides industrial overhaul of aircraft and shipboard 
components. The Coast Guard receives full reimbursement for these 
articles and services.”282 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
“The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency 
of the United Nations with the responsibility to develop and maintain a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for worldwide shipping. The 
result is a comprehensive body of international conventions, supported 
by hundreds of recommendations governing every facet of shipping 
including safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-
operation, maritime security and the efficiency of shipping...The U.S. 
Coast Guard has been a key participant at the IMO for all policy 
                                                 
280 “International Port Security Program,” USCG.  
281 “Mobile Training Teams,” USCG, last modified January 12, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/ 
international/trning_mob.asp/. 
282 “Acquiring Assets through Foreign Military Sales,” USCG. 
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development since the IMO Convention entered into force 50 years ago. 
Numerous U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters personnel take the lead in 
addressing international maritime issues and are assisted by various 




“The IPSLOs in U.S. Coast Guard Activities Far East engage with 47 
partner nations and territories in the regions of East Asia, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, Eurasia, Pacific and Africa.”284  
 
                                                 
283 “USCG IMO Homepage,” USCG. 
284 “United Information for Coast Guard Personnel,” USCG, last modified April 1, 2015, 
http://www.uscg.mil/acteur/uscg.asp.  
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APPENDIX D.  COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS: ALL DHS 
PROGRAMS 
The methodology used for this research was a policy analysis model that reviewed 
the international programs, their stated agency objectives, and the associated legal 
authorities for DHS’ role within the international environment. Where this information 
was not available or discoverable through open sources, the program was characterized 
with an “unknown.”  
As a model for comparison—and due to the relationship between foreign 
assistance and DHS’ international footprint—the international programs and activities 
conducted by DHS and its component agencies were then analyzed side-by-side with the 
five major funding categories used by the DOS to fund foreign assistance activities. This 
analysis was based on the stated agency purpose behind the program or activity compared 
to the attributes outlined in the definition of each assistance category. 
While some relationship between civilian security assistance was determined 
through this side-by-side review, stronger relationships were prevalent between TSA, 
CBP, and USCG. These similarities were uncovered through evaluation of each 
program’s stated objectives and background information discovered within this research. 
Therefore, as a recommendation, an additional framework was developed in order to 
define these similarities, based on the definitions presented in Table 3. 
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APPENDIX E.  STATE ASSISTANCE 
Table 4.   State/USAID Assistance by Objective and Program Area: 
FY 2006–2010 
 
In millions of current dollars. Figures encompass State and USAID appropriations only, including 
supplementals and Iraq and Afghanistan programs. Source: Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, 
Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy (CRS Report No. R40213) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), 5, February 2011, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
R40213.pdf. 
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APPENDIX F.  LEGISLATIVE MILESTONES 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, “The Role of Security Assistance in Historical 
Perspective,” in U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process, eds. Ernest Graves and 
Steven A. Hildreth (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1985), 183. 
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